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Abstract
Is the paradise of e¤ortless communication the ideal environment for knowledge
creation? Or, can the development of local culture in regions raise knowledge
productivity compared to a single region with a unitary culture? In other words,
can a real technological increase in the cost of collaboration and the cost of public
knowledge ow between regions, resulting in cultural di¤erentiation between regions,
increase welfare? In our framework, a culture is a set of ideas held exclusively by
residents of a location. In general in our model, the equilibrium path generates
separate cultures in di¤erent regions. When we compare this to the situation where
all workers are resident in one region, R & D workers become too homogeneous and
there is only one culture. As a result, equilibrium productivity in the creation of
new knowledge is lower relative to the situation when there are multiple cultures
and workers are more diverse.
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1 Introduction
If everything occurred at the same time there would be no de-
velopment. If everything existed in the same place there could be
no particularity. Only space makes possible the particular, which
then unfolds in time. Only because we are not equally near to
everything; only because everything does not rush in upon us at
once; only because our world is restricted, for every individual, for
his people, and for mankind as a whole, can we, in our niteness,
endure at all. ... Space creates and protects us in this limitation.
Particularity is the price of our existence. (Lösch, 1940, Epilogue)
Thus, as Lösch pointed out more than half a century ago, space has an
economic role aside from erecting barriers to trade in commodity markets.
Rephrasing this in terms of our context, the question we ask is: Can a real
technological increase in the cost of collaboration and cost of public knowledge
ow between regions increase welfare? Does the creation of a regional culture
of ideas in common among a population raise or lower productivity in the
creation of new knowledge? What role is played by interregional interaction
among researchers?
The deeper motivation for this work comes from three religious texts. The
biblical story of the Tower of Babel is told in Genesis 11: 1-9. When the
earth had only one language, residents dared to construct a tower to reach
heaven and make a name for themselves. The builders were scattered and
their languages confounded. Was this punishment, or a blessing in disguise?
The second religious text is Samuelson (1949). On pp. 194-195, an
angel descends from heaven:
Now suppose that an angel came down from heaven and notied
some fraction of all the labour and land units producing cloth-
ing that they were to be called Americans, the rest to be called
Europeans; and some di¤erent fraction of the food industry that
henceforth they were to carry American passports. Obviously, just
giving people and areas national labels does not alter anything: it
does not change commodity or factor prices or production patterns.
Again, if separation implies no changes in commodity market equilibrium,
but rather a divergence of cultures, the angel could improve welfare. The
devil, of course, is in the details. This discussion emphasizes the di¤erence
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between economic integration and the type of cultural integration or diversity
that is our focus.
The third text, Jacobs (1961, Part Two), discusses the role of diversity in
the urban context.
For illustrative purposes, suppose that there are locations, or regions, where
R & D can take place. R & D workers collaborating in di¤erent regions face
a discount in their productivity due to distance. There is public knowledge
transmission, for example through patenting, in a region, but inter-regional
public knowledge transmission is tempered by distance (lost in translation).
To get the intuition across, suppose that there is a single region in the
economy, with researchers or knowledge workers living in it. At the beginning
there is public knowledge transmission, for example through patenting, that
occurs within the region. With this structure and a relatively e¤ective public
knowledge transmission mechanism, the path of knowledge production actually
realized, called the equilibrium path, involves a pattern of work with people
rapidly changing partners located in the region. Even though the capacity of
researchers to absorb public information is limited, knowledge diversity within
the region is small.
Suppose now that the knowledge workers are suddenly di¤erentiated in
terms of their location. That is, half the workers are separated from the other
half, and all workers are presumed immobile. It becomes more costly for a
researcher to work with another in the other region as opposed to their home
region. Interaction between regions is open, in the sense that researchers
can work with those in the other region, and public knowledge is transmitted
between locations, but at a discount relative to public transmission within a
region. On the new equilibrium path, it is never best to work exclusively with
people in one location.
The key feature in our analysis is as follows. Knowledge diversity between
the two regions develops over time, but does not in itself improve productivity
within each region. Within each region, knowledge workers are relatively
homogeneous. To increase productivity, they must somehow di¤erentiate
themselves from one another. To accomplish this objective, they form the
inter-regional working groups that are the key to our results. Working groups
are available for intra-regional interaction as well, but in that context, they
only serve to increase the homogeneity of workers in the same working group
in the region, thus decreasing their productivity. Therefore, working groups
are never used by choice in the intra-regional context. In contrast, in the
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inter-regional context, intensive public knowledge transfer within a small inter-
regional working group can serve to di¤erentiate the members of that group
from others in the home region, increasing heterogeneity within each region
and thus increasing productivity.1 In the end, each agent will have to strike
a balance between time spent in a small inter-regional working group, and
time spent working with others in their own region who are not members of
the small inter-regional working group. This balance creates both diversity
within each region as well as higher productivity. In this way, productivity in
the creation of new ideas as well as the income obtained by researchers from
patents rise in the two-region economy. The maximal productivity attainable
is bounded by the maximum productivity of working with someone in another
region.
The model we present is a two region economy in which there are equal
populations of immobile knowledge workers in the regions. Each agent can
produce ideas on their own with the investment of time, but they can also
produce new ideas with a partner in either region. Knowledge production at
a given time is dependent on the set of ideas known exclusively by one or the
other partner, and the set of ideas that the two have in common. Ideas in
common are important for communication, whereas ideas known exclusively by
one of the partners is important for bringing originality into the potential part-
nership. When considering the choice of partners, the agents balance the costs
and benets of working with a partner within the same region and a partner
in the other region. There is a productivity cost for working with someone in
the other region, but there is a potential benet in that their knowledge prole
might be more appealing than the knowledge prole of residents of the home
region since they have more exclusive ideas than residents of the home region.
The agents are myopic in their choice of partners (or work in isolation) so they
maximize the ow of new ideas created. We use myopic core as the solution
concept.
Our results indicate that, given an initial situation where there is a high
degree of homogeneity in workers, division into two regions will result in a
big improvement in knowledge productivity when: 1) Heterogeneity (as op-
posed to homogeneity) of workersknowledge bases is important in the produc-
1As an example of inter-regional working groups in the context of economic research, focus
on Japan and the US. The set of researchers that are alumni of a particular university, say
the University of Rochester or the University of Chicago, form groups crossing international
boundaries with training and ideas in common that can promote new knowledge creation
and sharing among each groups participants.
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tion function for partnerships, so diversity increases productivity; 2) Inter-
regional public knowledge transmission is weak (since this promotes inter-
regional knowledge di¤erentiation); 3) Public knowledge transmission within
each inter-regional working group is e¤ective, so workers can di¤erentiate them-
selves from others in the same region rapidly; 4) The within-region public in-
formation transmission technology is very e¤ective so that autarky yields too
much homogeneity and thus is unproductive. The rapid recent development of
information technology increases the scope of the applicability of our analysis.
We shall discuss this issue further in the conclusions.
Culture comes into play in the following manner. In our framework, a cul-
ture is a set of ideas (dened formally in Section 2) held exclusively by residents
of a location (or in an alternative interpretation discussed in the Conclusion,
an ethnic group). In general in our model, the equilibrium path generates
separate cultures in di¤erent regions.2 Earlier work (see for example Berliant
and Fujita, 2008; Berliant and Fujita, 2009; Berliant and Fujita, 2010) did not
consider regions or locations, so there is no concept of culture. Our concept
of culture contrasts markedly with that commonly used in the literature. For
example, Guiso et al. (2006, p. 23) ...dene culture as those customary beliefs
and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged
from generation to generation. In contrast, our concept of culture is dynamic
and endogenous, and has nothing to do with either prior beliefs or preferences.
Our model has no uncertainty, and the preferences of all agents are identical.
But their stocks of knowledge di¤er.
The model has empirical content. Consider, for example, the Japanese
economy from 1993 to the present. In terms of per capita GDP, in 1993,
Japan ranked number one among OECD countries, declining to seventh place
in 2003, 14th place in 2006, and 19th place in 2008.3 The top ranked countries
in 2008 were all small, northern European countries (Luxembourg, Norway,
Switzerland, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Iceland, Sweden, Finland,
Austria). What happened to cause this? As is well known, dense commu-
nication and social networks (nomunication, or communication with drinking)
imply intensive interactions among co-workers, resulting in rapid learning from
others and fast growth when the country is less developed and most of the new
ideas arrive from external sources, but too much homogeneity among workers
2Lösch (1940) calls this spatial diversity particularity.
3The web site
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/h20-kaku/percapita.pdf contains interesting data on per
capita GDP of various OECD countries.
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when the country is more developed and on the cutting edge of innovation.
This increased homogeneity, particularly of knowledge workers, can slow inno-
vation and thus economic growth. In contrast, the top 10 countries are small,
but each has its own local language, university system, television, and more
generally, culture. The total population of these top 10 countries is about half
of Japans population. The total geographic span of these countries is about
the same as Japan, but each of these countries has its own local cultural center.
In contrast, Japan is very centralized in many respects, including media and
education. In the age of the knowledge economy, this result is consistent with
our conclusions.
There is an interesting empirical literature on culture, diversity and growth.
In this literature, diversity (or the characteristics of people) is generally taken
to be exogenous, but mobile. After adjusting for various econometric prob-
lems, most obviously reverse causality in that diversity is not random across
cities, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) nd that cultural diversity has a positive
e¤ect on the productivity of locals using U.S. data. Bellini et al. (2008) nd
similar e¤ects in European data. The e¤ects of immigration on local rents
and wages have been studied by Card (2007) and Ottaviano and Peri (2008).
The empirical e¤ects of the migration of culturally di¤erentiated workers on
innovation are studied in Agarwal et al (2008) and Kerr and Lincoln (2008).
Determinants of the R & D location decisions of multinational rms are ex-
amined in Belderbos et al (2009). In contrast with all of this literature, we
model diversity as endogenous and immobile, but demonstrate how diversity
and multiple cultures interacting can improve productivity.
More relevant to our work is the empirical paper of Cardoso et al (2010) on
international trends in economic research. They nd that a countrys progress
in publishing in top journals is correlated with international collaborations
between coauthors, consistent with our analysis.
Section 2 gives the model and notation, Section 3 gives preliminary analysis
of the model, whereas Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium path of dynamics
in the knowledge production sector. Section 5 gives our conclusions and
suggestions for future knowledge workers. Three appendices, available on the
rst authors personal web page, provide the proofs of key results.
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2 The Model
The economy consists of two regions called A and B. As explained in the
introduction, initially there are no di¤erences between workers in the two re-
gions, as there are no barriers between them and there is in reality only one
region. But this notation is useful later, when workers are exogenously (and
suddenly) separated into the two regions. There are N R & D workers, also
calledK-workers, in each region, and they are immobile. The set ofK-workers
in region A is denoted by the same notation A, whereas the set of K-workers in
region B is denoted by B. This simplies notation, and it should be obvious
from the context which meaning applies.
Production of a new manufactured commodity requires the purchase of
a patent. To keep matters simple, we do not elaborate the details of the
manufacturing sector, but refer the interested reader to Berliant and Fujita
(2011). These patents are produced by the R & D sector, and they are the
only output of this sector. Each new patent embodies a new idea. Not all
new ideas result in patents. New ideas are produced by K-workers using their
prior stock of knowledge. The scheme for producing new ideas is described
as a knowledge production process. Income for R & D workers is derived
exclusively from the sale of patents.
The basic layout of this sector is similar to Berliant and Fujita (2008).
While avoiding excessive repetition, we present below the details of the R &
D process.
At any given time, each K-worker has a stock of knowledge that has some
commonalities with other K-workers but some knowledge distinct from other
workers. Since workers possess knowledge exclusive of others, they may wish
to cooperate with each other in the knowledge production process. Hetero-
geneity of knowledge in a partnership brings more originality, but knowledge
in common is important for communication. Thus, K-worker heterogeneity
is an essential feature of the model and of the knowledge production process.
The K-workers choose to work alone or with a partner, maximizing their my-
opic payo¤, namely the value of patents produced at that time. The solution
concept used is the myopic core. If they work alone, new ideas are produced
as a function of the total number of ideas known by a K-worker. If a pair of
workers produces new ideas together, their knowledge production is a function
of their knowledge in common on the one hand and the knowledge they have
that is distinct from their partner on the other. Knowledge that is produced
by an agent at a given time becomes part of the stock of knowledge for that
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agent in the future. In addition, some of these ideas become patented and are
sold to the manufacturing sector. The ideas embodied in the patents become
public, and thus will be available to be learned by all the agents in the R & D
sector.
The basic unit of knowledge is called an idea.4 The number of potential
ideas is innite. In this paper, we will treat ideas symmetrically. In describing
the process of knowledge production, that is either accomplished alone or in
cooperation with another K-worker, the su¢ cient statistics about the state of
knowledge of a K-worker i at a given time can be described as follows. We
shall focus on K-worker i and her potential partner K-worker j. First, ni(t)
represents the total stock of is ideas at time t. Second, ncij(t) represents the
total stock of ideas that i has in common with K-worker j at time t. Third,
ndij(t) represents the stock of ideas that i knows but j doesnt know at time t.
Finally, ndji(t) represents the stock of ideas that j knows but i doesnt know at
time t. Our denition of culture is the set of ideas held in common by (namely
the intersection of K-worker sets of ideas of) the residents of a region.
By denition, ncij(t) = n
c
ji(t). It also holds by denition that
ni(t) = n
c
ij(t) + n
d
ij(t) (1)
Knowledge is a set of ideas that are possessed by a person at a particular
time. However, knowledge is not a static concept. New knowledge can be
produced either individually or jointly, and ideas can be shared with others.
But all of this activity takes time.
Now we describe the components of the rest of the model. To keep the
description as simple as possible, we focus on just two agents, i and j. At each
time, each agent faces a decision about whether or not to meet with others. If
two agents want to meet at a particular time, a meeting will occur. If an agent
decides not to meet with anyone at a given time, then the agent creates new
knowledge separately, away from everyone else. If two persons do decide to
meet at a given time, then they collaborate to create new knowledge together.5
At each moment of time, there are two mutually exclusive ways to produce
new knowledge. The rst way is to work alone, away from others. We denote
the event thatK-worker i does research alone at time t by ii(t) = 1, indicating
4In principle, all of these time-dependent quantities are positive integers. However, for
simplicity we take them to be continuous (in R+) throughout the paper.
5Since there is an innity of potential ideas, the probability that the same idea is du-
plicated by any K-worker or K-workers (even at di¤erent points of time) is assumed to be
zero.
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that i works with herself. Otherwise, ii(t) = 0. Alternatively, K-worker i can
choose to work with a partner, say K-worker j in either region. We denote
the event that K-worker i wishes to work with j at time t by ij(t) = 1.
Otherwise, ij(t) = 0. In equilibrium, this partnership is realized at time t if
ij(t) = ji(t) = 1.
Consider rst the case where K-worker i works alone. In this case, idea
production is simply a function of the stock of is ideas at that time. Let
aii(t) be the rate of production of new ideas created by person i in isolation at
time t. Then we assume that their creation of new knowledge during isolation
is proportional to their stock of knowledge ni(t) at time t:
aii(t) =   ni(t) when ii(t) = 1 (2)
where  is a positive constant.
If a meeting occurs between i and j at time t (ij(t) = ji(t) = 1), then
joint knowledge creation occurs, and it is governed by the following dynamics.
In the case where both K-worker i and K-worker j reside in the same
region and agree to work together, namely when ij(t) = ji(t) = 1 for j 6= i,
joint knowledge creation is given by:
aij(t) = 2  (ncij)  (ndij  ndji)
1 
2 when i; j 2 A or i; j 2 B (3)
where 0 <  < 1,  > 0. These parameters are explained just below.
In the case where K-worker i and K-worker j reside in di¤erent regions
and agree to work together, namely when ij(t) = ji(t) = 1 for j 6= i, joint
knowledge creation is given by:
aij(t) =   2  (ncij)  (ndij ndji)
1 
2 when i 2 A and j 2 B, or j 2 A and i 2 B
(4)
where 0 <  < 1. Due to the distance between the regions, we assume that
when two K-workers live in di¤erent places, their collaborative research pro-
ductivity is reduced by a factor of  . Some time (and knowledge production)
is lost when one researcher visits a collaborator in another region. Or time is
lost due to di¤erences in languages. But these are just examples. In general,
we are simply assuming that research productivity is reduced due to distance
between collaborators.
So when two people meet, joint knowledge creation occurs at a rate propor-
tional to the normalized product of their knowledge in common, the di¤erential
knowledge of i from j, and the di¤erential knowledge of j from i. The parame-
ter  represents the overall level of joint knowledge productivity. Moreover,
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the rate of creation of new knowledge is high when the proportions of ideas
in common, ideas exclusive to person i, and ideas exclusive to person j are
in balance. The parameter  represents the weight on knowledge in common
as opposed to di¤erential knowledge in the production of new ideas. Ideas
in common are necessary for communication, whereas ideas exclusive to one
person or the other imply more heterogeneity or originality in the collabora-
tion. The special case where  tends to 1 captures the circumstance where
di¤erent knowledge is unproductive; for example, knowing a theorem that po-
tential partners dont know is unproductive relative to everyone knowing that
theorem.
Income for the research sector derives from selling patents. But not all
ideas are patentable. For every collection of ideas created, we assume that
 proportion are patentable as blueprints of new products. Thus, they are
sold to the manufacturing sector. The residual ideas, namely 1  proportion
of new ideas, becomes tacit knowledge that is only known to the creator or
creators of these ideas. They are useful for future creation of yet further
ideas.
Let yi(t) to be the income of K-worker i at time t, and let (t) be the price
of patents at time t. Then, suppressing t for notational simplicity:
yi =     (ii  aii +
X
j 6=i
ij  aij=2) (5)
The formula implies that the revenue from new patents is split evenly if two
K-workers are producing new ideas together. The K-workers take the price 
as given at each time, so the assumption of myopia on their part implies that
the price does not a¤ect their behavior. For this reason, we do not consider
explicitly the market for patents in the remainder of the paper.
Concerning the rule used by an agent to choose their best partner, to keep
the model tractable in this rst analysis, we assume a myopic rule. At each
moment of time t, person i would like a meeting with person j in either region
when her income while meeting with j is highest among all potential partners,
including herself. Maximizing income at a given time amounts to choosing
fijg2Nj=1 so that the right hand side of (5) is highest, meaning that a selection
is made only among the most productive partners. Loosely speaking, this
interaction could be modeled as a noncooperative game, with player i choosing
fijg2Nj=1 as strategies, and equilibrium implying that for each pair of players
i and j, j 6= i, ij = ji, whereas ij > 0 only for those players j that yield
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maximal payo¤s for player i.6
This noncooperative approach is useful for explaining the ideas behind
our model, but we employ a cooperative approach for two reasons. First,
it gives the same equilibrium path as the noncooperative approach but with
less cumbersome notation and structure. Second, as we are attempting to
model close interactions within groups, it is plausible that agents will act
cooperatively. We assume that at each time, the myopic persons interacting
choose a core conguration. That is, we restrict attention to congurations
such that at any point in time, no coalition of persons can get together and
make themselves better o¤ in that time period. In essence, our solution concept
at a point in time is the myopic core.
Although knowledge creation in isolation or in pairs represents the basic
forms of knowledge creation, it turns out that the equilibrium path often re-
quires a mixture of these basic forms, namely ij takes on fractional values.
The reason is that on the equilibrium path, K-workers wish to form groups
where close interaction takes place in pairs within the group but there is no
direct interaction between groups. This is a natural way to balance com-
munication and diversity preservation. K-workers in the same group wish to
change partners within the group as frequently as possible. The purpose is
to balance the proportion of di¤erent and common ideas with partners within
the same group as best as can be achieved. This suggests a work pattern with
rapidly changing partners on the equilibrium path, that is, a work pattern
where a worker rotates through xed partners as fast as possible in order to
maximize the instantaneous increase in income. For example, worker 1 chooses
K-workers 2 and 3 as partners, and rotates between the two partners under
equilibrium values of 12 and 13 such that 12+13 = 1. Worker 1 might wish
to work with workers 2 and 3 for half of each month, but wants to alternate
between them so that worker 1 does not have the same partner on consecutive
days. As time intervals in this discrete time model become shorter, the limit
6More formally, out of equilibrium payo¤s are dened and a selection or renement of
Nash equilibrium used as in Berliant et al. (2006, pp. 77-78). A renement of Nash equilib-
rium is necessary to exclude some trivial equilibria, for example where nobody ever chooses
to meet anyone else. Specically, choose 1 >  > 0 and positive constants ffijgNi=1;j<i such
that
PN
i=1
P
j<i fij = . Dene fji = fij for j > i. Then the payo¤s for the noncooperative
game are specied as follows. Fix strategies fijg2Ni;j=1. For K-workers i and j for whom
ij 6= ji, a meeting of length fij = fji occurs. For K-workers i and j for whom ij = ji
(excluding j = i) a meeting of length (1  )  ij occurs. Work in isolation (ii) is assigned
the residual time. The Nash equilibria we select are the equilibria when  = 0, but that are
also limits of Nash equilibria as ! 0.
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is a fractional 1j (j = 2; 3) where 12 = 13 = 1=2. Other K-workers behave
analogously. In order for this type of work pattern to take place, of course, all
persons must agree to follow this pattern. In general, we allow ij 2 [0; 1],
and for all i,
P2N
j=1 ij = 1. In equilibrium, ij = ji for all i; j = 1; 2; :::; 2N .
As noted previously, all agents take prices, in this case , as given, imply-
ing:
max
fijg2Nj=1
(ii  aii +
X
j 6=i
ij  aij=2) (6)
subject to the obvious constraints:
2NX
j=1
ij = 1, ij  0 for i = 1; :::; 2N (7)
Since ni is a stock variable, this is equivalent to
max
fijg2Nj=1
(
ii  aii +
P
j 6=i ij  aij=2
ni
) (8)
In order to rewrite this problem in a convenient form, we rst dene the
total number of ideas possessed by i and j:
nij = ndij + n
d
ji + n
c
ij (9)
and dene new variables
mcij  mcji =
ncij
nij
=
ncji
nij
mdij =
ndij
nij
, mdji =
ndji
nij
By denition, mdij represents the proportion of ideas exclusive to person i
among all the ideas known by person i or person j. Similarly, mcij represents
the proportion of ideas known in common by persons i and j among all the
ideas known by the pair. From (9), we obtain
1 = mdij +m
d
ji +m
c
ij (10)
whereas (9) and (1) yield
ni = (1 mdji)  nij (11)
Using these identities and new variables, while recalling the knowledge
production function (3), we obtain (see Technical Appendix a for details)
aij = ni  2G(mdij;mdji) for j 6= i in the same region (12)
aij = ni    2G(mdij;mdji) for j 6= i in di¤erent regions (13)
12
where
G(mdij;m
d
ji) 

 
1 mdij  mdji
  (mdij mdji) 1 2
1 mdji
(14)
For ease of notation, we write A i for the set of K-workers in region A less
agent i. Analogous notation holds for region B.
For K-worker i in region A, using (2) and (12), we can rewrite the income
function (5) as
yi =     ni  (ii  +
X
j2A i
ij G(mdij;mdji) +
X
j2B
ij   G(mdij;mdji)) (15)
and the optimization problem (8) as follows:
max
fijg2Nj=1
(ii  +
X
j2A i
ij G(mdij;mdji) +
X
j2B
ij   G(mdij;mdji)) (16)
subject to the obvious constraints (7).
Suppose that for each i = 1; 2; :::; 2N , fijg2Nj=1 solves the optimization
problem immediately above. Furthermore, suppose that it happens to be the
case that
ij = 

ji for i; j = 1; 2; :::; 2N
Then, by construction, fijg2Ni;j=1 must also be the solution to the following
social optimization problem:
maxf
2NX
i=1
yi j
2NX
j=1
ij = 1, ij  0, ij = ji for i; j = 1; 2; :::; 2Ng
Thus, fijg2Ni;j=1 is in the myopic core.
Next we turn to the acquisition of new knowledge by each individual. There
are two ways to acquire new knowledge for a K-worker: internal production
of new ideas and information from public sources. The rst way has the
feature that ideas produced alone are attributed to that worker, whereas ideas
produced in pairs are attributed to both K-workers who produce them. In
either case, the new ideas are learned by exactly the people who produce them.
The second source of knowledge acquisition derives from the new ideas that are
patented. The patented ideas become public information immediately. Some
of this public information is learned by the knowledge workers. However, their
capacity for learning this public knowledge is limited. We call the constant
C the learning capacity of a knowledge worker. As we shall detail next,
there are 4 sources of public knowledge. Each time period for learning public
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information is divided into two subperiods. In the rst subperiod, public
knowledge generated from pairs of workers in the same region is studied. In
the second subperiod, public knowledge generated from pairs of workers from
di¤erent regions is studied by the knowledge workers. In each subperiod, there
are two competing sources of new public knowledge. But in both subperiods,
learning capacity is limited.
As we discuss next and as justied in subsection 1 of Appendix 1, we in-
troduce the following specications for the public knowledge absorption tech-
nology, explained in detail just below:
 =
C
(N   1) 
1
1 + e (17)
e = C
N
 e
1 + e (18)
b = bC
  2(N   1) (19)
 ! =
 !
C
2(N   1) (20)
where bC + !C = C (21)
and
 !
C =
(
C  N
N
for N < N
C for N  N (22)
A certain proportion of patented ideas in a region, , are learned by all of the
K-workers in that region. In general,  will be a decreasing function of N .
Limited time and energy determine how many of these new, public ideas can be
learned. Due to these limitations, the amount of information a K-worker can
learn from patents in their region at a given time is, roughly, proportional to
the number of new ideas she can create in that time. The number of new ideas
and thus patents is proportional to the number of K-workers in that region,
so as detailed in equation (17),  will be inversely proportional to N .7 Thus,
these ideas become knowledge in common for all K-workers in that region.8
7In theory, it might be possible to accumulate a stock of ideas patented in past periods to
learn in the future. The problem with this is that such information perpetually accumulates,
and thus due to time constraints there is never an opportunity to learn the content of older
patented ideas.
8It has been suggested that if K-workers become too homogeneous, they might learn
the patented ideas selectively so as not to overlap with the knowledge acquired by other
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A second source of friction between regions, beyond the direct cost of col-
laboration, is in public information transmission. It is natural to assume that
public knowledge is transmitted better to workers in the same region where it
was created. Some is lost in translation in the process of communication
to the other region. This could be viewed as a pure language issue, but more
usefully, the creators of the knowledge possess some human capital related to
the creation of the idea in their region that is not present in the other region.
Some ideas are lost in translation, or some time is lost in translation so not as
many of the ideas can be publicly communicated between regions as within a
single region. Yet another interpretation of this idea is that questions can be
asked of researchers who live within the region, thus making communication
of their new discoveries easier for those who live nearby than for those who
live far away.
The absorption of public knowledge transmitted from the other region,
namely produced by two partners residing in the other region, is discounted
by a factor e, 0  e < 1, relative to public knowledge produced by partners
resident in ones own home region; see equation (18). This gives us e < .
Public ideas produced by partnerships of the same type (categorized by regions
of residence of the partners) are substitutes.
Next we turn to public knowledge attributable to inter-regional partner-
ships, namely where the partners live in di¤erent regions. In general, such
public knowledge is assumed to be complementary to public knowledge pro-
duced by partners exclusively resident in one location or the other. There are
two types of such public knowledge, and according to equation (21) they are
assumed to be substitutes for each other. The rst is general public knowl-
edge from inter-regional cooperation, represented by b. It is analogous to
the previous concepts, namely public knowledge derived from pairs of partners
from di¤erent regions, and is given by equation (19). In what follows we natu-
rally assume b < .9 The nal type of public information transmission is from
inter-regional working groupsconsisting of people from both regions working
together; these groups develop endogenously, as explained in detail in Section
4.2. For these groups, public information is transmitted only within the group
itself, not to the general population of either region. The e¤ectiveness of this
last kind of public knowledge transmission is represented by  ! , and is given
K-workers in the same fashion. However, this level of coordination, especially when N is
large, seems far-fetched. It seems more likely that ideas attractive for whatever reason will
be learned by all.
9Of course, this actually follows from equations (17) and (19) and the denition of e.
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in equation (20). For these inter-regional working groups, it is assumed in
equation (22) that the e¤ectiveness of public knowledge transmission within
the inter-regional working group increases with group size N up to a point
(N), above which it is constant.
It should be evident at this point that  on the one hand and e, b,  !
and  on the other are empirically related. The productivity of long distance
collaboration is correlated with the e¤ectiveness of public knowledge transmis-
sion between regions, but not perfectly. Public knowledge transmission can
be ine¤ective if the library of one collaborator in region A does not subscribe
to some journals published in region B for reasons of cost or language, but this
does not prohibit collaborations between authors in di¤erent regions. Some
correlation may derive from language di¤erences that a¤ect both collaboration
and public knowledge transmission between regions. In what follows, we treat
all of these exogenous parameters as independent.
Next, for each of the four di¤erent types of new ideas created at each
moment, we calculate their number. Let us focus on agent i, as the expressions
for the other agents are analogous. Let IAA be the total number of ideas
created at a given moment by researchers resident exclusively in region A:
IAA =
X
k2A
kk  akk + (
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  akl)=2 (23)
Similarly, let IBB be the total number of ideas created at a given moment by
researchers resident exclusively in region B:
IBB =
X
k2B
kk  akk + (
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  akl)=2 (24)
Next, let IAB be the total number of ideas created at a given moment by pairs
where one researcher is resident in A and the other is resident in B:
IAB =
X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  akl (25)
Finally, inter-regional interaction will occur in subsets of the population called
groups. Each K-worker will belong to exactly one inter-regional group. Fo-
cusing on one particular K-worker i 2 A, we dene their group to be
 i = f iA; iBg
where i 2  iA,  iA represents the set of people from region A to which i is
associated, whereas  iB represents the set of people from region B to which i
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is associated. We dene ideas generated within a group  i as
I i =
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  akl
Within each group, people work exclusively with the workers from the other re-
gion, not with the workers from their own region. (Intra-regional partnerships
were already considered in (23) and (24).)
The dynamics of the knowledge system are based on the assumption that
once learned, ideas are not forgotten. Using the argument above, we obtain
knowledge system dynamics. First, we provide the dynamics of the new
knowledge learned by each K-worker:
For i 2 A: (26)
_ni =
X
j2A
ij  aij +
X
j2B
ij  aij +     (IAA  
X
j2A
ij  aij)
+e    IBB + b    (IAB  X
j2B
ij  aij) + !  (I i  
X
j2 iB
ij  aij)
For i 2 B: (27)
_ni =
X
j2A
ij  aij +
X
j2B
ij  aij +     (IBB  
X
j2B
ij  aij)
+e    IAA + b    (IAB  X
j2A
ij  aij) + !  (I i  
X
j2 iA
ij  aij)
For the new knowledge in common learned by each pair of K-workers i and j,
we have:
For i 2 A, j 2 A: (28)
j 2  iA: _ncij = ij  aij +     (IAA   ij  aij) + e    IBB + b    IAB + !  I i
j =2  iA: _ncij = ij  aij +     (IAA   ij  aij) + e    IBB + b    IAB
For i 2 A, j 2 B: (29)
j 2  iB: _ncij = ij  aij + e    IAA + e    IBB + b    (IAB   ij  aij)
+ !  (I i   ij  aij)
j =2  iB: _ncij = ij  aij + e    IAA + e    IBB + b    (IAB   ij  aij)
Finally, for each pair of K-workers i and j, we obtain the new knowledge
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learned exclusively by i as follows:
For i 2 A, j 2 A: (30)
j 2  iA: _ndij = (1    ) 
X
k2A j
ik  aik + (1  b  ) X
k2B
ik  aik
j =2  iA: _ndij = (1    ) 
X
k2A j
ik  aik + (1  b  ) X
k2B
ik  aik
+ !  (I i  
X
k2 iB
ik  aik)
For i 2 A, j 2 B: (31)
j 2  iB: _ndij = (1  e  ) X
k2A
ik  aik + (1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik  aik
+(     e  )  (IAA  X
j2A
ij  aij)
j =2  iB: _ndij = (1  e  ) X
k2A
ik  aik + (1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik  aik
+(     e  )  (IAA  X
j2A
ij  aij) + !  (I i  
X
k2 iB
ik  aik)
For i 2 A, j 2 B: (32)
j 2  iB: _ndji = (1  e  ) X
k2B
jk  ajk + (1  b  )  X
k2A i
jk  ajk
+(     e  )  (IBB  X
k2B
jk  ajk)
j =2  iB: _ndji = (1  e  ) X
k2B
jk  ajk + (1  b  )  X
k2A i
jk  ajk
+(     e  )  (IBB  X
k2B
jk  ajk) + !  (I j  
X
k2 iA
jk  ajk)
To give more intuition, let us explain equation (26) in detail. The left hand
side of this equation represents new knowledge learned by person i. The rst
two terms on the right hand side represent private knowledge creation. The
next two terms,     (IAA 
X
j2A
ij  aij)+ e    IBB, represent the absorption
of public knowledge created by partners respectively in A and in B. These
two sources of public knowledge compete with each other, since the total pub-
lic knowledge learning capacity from these two sources is C. The nal two
terms, b    (IAB  X
j2B
ij  aij) + !  (I i  
P
j2 iB ij  aij), represent the
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absorption of public knowledge created by partners in di¤erent regions. The
rst term represents absorption of general public knowledge that is created by
all partnerships with one member from region A and the other from region
B, whereas the second term represents absorption of specic public knowl-
edge that is created within a workers inter-regional working group. These
two sources of public knowledge compete with each other, since total learning
capacity from these two sources is C.
Thus, equations (26) and (27) say that the increase in the knowledge of
person i is the sum of: the knowledge created in isolation, the knowledge
created jointly with someone else, and the transfer of new knowledge from new
patents. Equations (28) and (29) mean that the increase in the knowledge in
common for persons i and j equals the new knowledge created jointly by them
plus the transfer of knowledge from new patents. Finally, equations (30), (31)
and (32) mean that all the knowledge created by person i either in isolation
or joint with persons other than person j becomes a part of the di¤erential
knowledge of person i from person j, except for patented ideas that are learned
by K-workers.10
In Section 6.2 of Appendix 1, we collect the elements of the dynamics of _n
and _mdij, describing them in terms of ni and m
d
ij (i; j = 1; :::; 2N) only.
3 Knowledge Dynamics in the Pairwise Sym-
metric Situation
Since we are concerned with the macro behavior of the economy and the big
picture in terms of culture, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. We
impose the assumption that the initial state of knowledge for all K-workers is
pairwise symmetric in terms of heterogeneity.
Suppose that at some given time, all K-workers across the two regions have
the same stock of ideas:
ni = nj for all i and j (33)
Using equation (11), since nij = nji by denition, it follows that
mdij = m
d
ji for all i 6= j (34)
10We do not assume that when persons work together, all of their previously learned
knowledge is transferred between them over time. This would lead to a kind of contagion
model. We study this separately for a simplied framework in Berliant and Fujita (2009).
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meaning that the proportions of di¤erential knowledge are pairwise symmetric.
Equation (16) is simplied as
max
fijg2Nj=1
(ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  g(mdij) +
X
j2B
ij    g(mdij)) (35)
where the function g is dened as
g(m)  G(m;m)   (1  2m)
m(1 )
1 m (36)
Furthermore, since aij = aji by denition, substituting (34) into (12) yields
aij=2
ni
=
aji=2
nj
= g(mdij) for i and j in the same region (37)
aij=2
ni
=
aji=2
nj
=   g(mdij) for i and j in di¤erent regions (38)
Thus, when two K-workers i and j in the same region cooperate in knowledge
production and their knowledge states are symmetric, g(mdij) represents the
creation of new ideas per capita (normalized by the size of individual knowledge
input, ni). Analogously, when two K-workers i and j in di¤erent regions
cooperate in knowledge production and their knowledge states are symmetric,
 g(mdij) represents the creation of new ideas per capita (normalized by the size
of individual knowledge input, ni). In this context, condition (35) means that
eachK-worker wishes to engage in knowledge production in a partnership with
a person (possibly including herself) leading to the highest K-productivity.
Figure 1 illustrates the graph of the intra-regional K-productivity function
g(m) as the upper bold curve for parameter values  = 1 and  = 1=3. In
addition, it illustrates the inter-regional K-productivity function   g(m) as
the lower bold curve for the same parameters and  = 0:89.
FIGURE 1 GOES HERE
Di¤erentiating g(m) yields
g0(m) = g(m)  (1  )  (2  ) m
(1  2m) m  (1 m)
implying that
g0(m)
>
<
0 as m
<
>
1  
2   for m 2 (0;
1
2
) (39)
Thus, g(m) is strictly quasi-concave on [0; 1=2], achieving its maximal value at
mB =
1  
2   (40)
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which we call the Bliss Point. It is the point where knowledge productivity
is highest for each person. Notice that the bliss point is the same for the two
curves. Also in Figure 1, we dene the point mS by the condition:
g(mS) =   g(mB), mS < mB (41)
Since mS is dened uniquely as a function of exogenous parameters, we write
mS = mS( ; ).
Substituting (36) into (15), we have the income equation for K-worker
i 2 A:
yi =     ni  [ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  g(mdij) +
X
j2B
ij    g(mdij)] (42)
At this point, it is useful to remind the reader that we are using a myopic
core concept to determine equilibrium at each point in time. In fact, it is
necessary to sharpen that concept in the model with 2N persons. When there
is more than one vector of strategies that is in the myopic core at a particular
time, namely more than one vector of joint strategies implies the same, highest
income for all persons, the one with the highest rst derivative of income _yi is
selected. Furthermore, when the derivative of income is still the same among
best options, agent i chooses an option that maximizes the second derivative
of income,
::
yi, and so on. The justication for this assumption is that at each
point in time, people are attempting to maximize the ow of income. The
formal denition of the myopic core and proof that it is nonempty can be found
in Berliant and Fujita (2008, Appendix 0). Although the theorem is general,
in the remainder of this paper we shall focus on the symmetric case.
Taking the time derivative,11
_yi = f _    ni +    _nig  (43)
[ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  g(mdij) +
X
j2B
ij    g(mdij)]
+    ni[
X
j2A i
ij  g0(mdij)  _mdij +
X
j2B
ij    g0(mdij)  _mdij]
11From (35), when fijg2Nj=1 is chosen optimally by person i, we have
yi =     ni  (
X
j2A i
ij +
X
j2B
ij) maxf; max
j2A i
g(mdij);max
j2B
  g(mdij)g
where
P
j2A i ij +
P
j2B ij = 1. Thus, in taking the time derivative of (42), except
possibly on a set of measure zero, we have
P
j2A i
_ij +
P
j2B _ij = 0, and hence (43)
follows.
21
where X
j2A
ij +
X
j2B
ij = 1 for all i 2 A [B
When the symmetry condition (34) holds, using (33) and (36), the dynamics
of ni and mdij can be rewritten as in Section 6.3 of Appendix 1, where it is
obvious that the basic rules that govern knowledge dynamics in the pairwise
symmetric case are described in terms of ni and mdij (i; j = 1; 2; :::2N) only.
Notice that the expression for person is income, (15), does not contain
ji for j 6= i. Hence equations (16) and (35) do not contain it either. But
the expression (43) for _y contains _mdij, which in turn involves all of flkg2Nl;k=1.
Thus, when person i performs the optimization problem maxfijg2Nli;j=1 _yi, a cru-
cial question is whether the feasibility constraint ij = ji for each j 6= i is
considered as a constraint by person i or not. If so, then our subsequent
expressions, particularly for _mdij, feature cancellation of ij with ji, and our
algebra becomes much simpler. Otherwise such cancellation is impossible and
the analysis becomes much more complex. However, since we are dealing
with myopic core rather than a noncooperative game structure, we can take a
simpler approach in this work.
4 The Equilibrium Path of Knowledge Dynam-
ics
4.1 One Region
First we study the case of one region. This is the paradise of e¤ortless com-
munication, Babel before the intervention of a deity. Formally speaking, there
is only one region, say region A, in this spaceless economy of 2N K-workers.
In the dynamics, we drop all of the terms related to residents of region B, and
simplify the expressions derived in Appendix 6.3 as follows:
For i 2 A: (44)
_ni
ni
= [ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  2g
 
mdij

]
+    [
X
k2A i
kk  +
X
k2A i
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl

]
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For i 2 A,
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1 mdji)
8<:ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2g(mdik)
9=;
 mdij 
8<:ij  2g(mdij) +    
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
359=;
 mdij 
8<:jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2g(mdjk)
9=;
The initial state of knowledge is given by
ncij(0) = n
c(0) for all i 6= j (45)
ndij(0) = n
d(0) for all i 6= j (46)
implying that
ni(0) = n
c(0) + nd(0)  n(0) (47)
At the initial state, each pair of K-workers has the same number of ideas,
nc(0), in common. Moreover, for any pair of K-workers, the number of ideas
that one K-worker knows but the other does not know is the same and equal
to nd(0). Given that the initial state of knowledge is symmetric among the
K-workers, as seen below, it turns out that the equilibrium conguration at
any time also maintains the basic pairwise symmetry among K-workers.
Now we are ready to investigate the actual equilibrium path, depending on
the given initial composition of knowledge,
mdij(0) = m
d(0) =
nd(0)
nc(0) + 2nd(0)
which is common for all pairs i and j (i 6= j).
In the rest of paper, we assume that N is su¢ ciently large so that for any
nite constant , we can use the approximation:

N
 0 (48)
In the remainder of this paper, we also assume that
 < g(mB) (49)
so as to avoid the trivial case of all agents always working in isolation.
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In Figure 1, let mJ and mI be dened on the horizontal axis at the left in-
tersection and the right intersection between the g(m) curve and the horizontal
line at height , respectively.
Previous work characterized the equilibrium path of knowledge creation
dynamics in a single region. The various equilibrium paths are determined by
the initial heterogeneity of the K-workers. To be precise, from Berliant and
Fujita (2011), we have:
Proposition 1: Assume that the number of K-workers 2N is su¢ ciently
large. The equilibrium path of K-worker interactions and the sink point of
the knowledge creation process depend on the initial condition, md(0).
When initial heterogeneity satises mJ < md(0)  mB, the myopic core
path follows one of two subcases. Let eC  2
1  .
(a) C < eC. The myopic core path consists of an initial time interval
in which each K-worker is always paired with another but trades partners as
rapidly as possible (with ij = 1=(2N   1) for all i and for all j 6= i). When
the bliss point, mB = 1 
2  , is attained, the agents split into groups of sizeeNB = 1 + 1
  (1 )C
2
, and they remain at the bliss point.
(b) C > eC. The myopic core path has all K-workers paired with
another but trading partners as rapidly as possible (with ij = 1=(2N   1) for
all i and for all j 6= i). This continues forever. The equilibrium path remains
to the left of the bliss point, so the bliss point is never attained. The sink point
is maut =
1
2+C
2
.
Other initial conditions for the system are possible, but we refer to Berliant
and Fujita (2008, 2009, 2011) for detailed examination of the other cases. For
completeness, we wish to note that long term collaboration between partners
is an equilibrium outcome for some other cases, and that although we presume
agents to be myopic, we have shown that the equilibrium path has surprising
e¢ ciency properties, so the results would be unchanged if we considered agents
who were not myopic. With this justication, our focus is on myopic agents
for reasons of simplicity.
Since we wish to examine how the knowledge creation system responds
to the introduction of interaction with another region, our focus in the
remainder of the paper is on case (b). The reason for this focus is as
follows. Both cases specify initial heterogeneity to the left of the bliss point,
so K-workers are too homogeneous relative to maximal productivity at the
bliss point. In case (a), public knowledge transmission is relatively weak, as
specied by a low value of C. Thus, even though workers start out relatively
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homogeneous, they can di¤erentiate themselves from others by working with
everyone else, and eventually attain the relative heterogeneity and maximal
productivity of the bliss point without any sort of intervention. In contrast,
for case (b), public knowledge transmission is strong, represented by a high
value of C. Even though one K-worker works with all others, the state
maut to the left of the bliss point, namely with more worker homogeneity and
lower productivity than optimal, is the steady state. Try as they might, the
knowledge workers cannot climb the productivity hill from the left, because the
public knowledge force pushes them back. Here is where divine intervention
and culture that is local in nature can improve matters.
In case (b), the dynamics imply that only one large group forms within
the region, so each agent works with everyone else an equal amount of time.
Heterogeneity md changes, approaching the sink point given by:
maut =
1
2 + C
2
< mB =
1  
2   (50)
The sink point is to the left of the bliss point, so the bliss point is never reached.
Intuitively, this is due to the large externality from public knowledge; it is
impossible to attain su¢ cient heterogeneity. Without loss of generality, we
assume that:
mJ  maut < mB
From Appendix 6.3, and using (17) in the case where region A has popula-
tion 2N and e is set to 1, we obtain the knowledge growth rate of individuals
at the sink point as follows:
For i 2 A:
_ni
ni
= [ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  2g (maut)]
+    [
X
k2A i
kk  +
X
k2A i
X
l2A k
kl  g (maut)]
= 2g(maut) +     (2N   1)  g(maut)
= 2g(maut) + C  g(maut)
= g(maut)  (2 + C) (51)
Thus, given the learning capacity C, the knowledge growth rate is proportional
to individual K-productivity g(maut). In the case of Figure 1, for example,
the sink point maut is far to the left of the bliss point; thus, g(m

aut) is much
lower than   g(mB). This suggests that if division of the population into
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two regions results in greater heterogeneity of knowledge composition in each
region, then the knowledge growth rate of the economy will increase; we shall
discuss this in detail in the next subsection.
4.2 Di¤erentiation Between Two Regions
When the builders of the tower are scattered and their languages confounded,
one region is split into two regions, A and B, each with the same population
N . Now there is friction when working with someone from the other region,
namely  < 1, and public knowledge transmission between the two regions
becomes more di¢ cult than it was with only one region. Public knowledge
from the other region is discounted by e < 1. We claim that after expulsion
from paradise, and confounding of languages, a New Edencan be achieved.
In other words, introduction of real costs of communication between two regions
actually can result in a welfare improvement.
Figure 2 depicts the state of the New Eden wheremdij = m
S for every active
intra-regional pair i and j whereas mdij = m
B for every active inter-regional
pair i and j, implying that the K-productivity of each K-worker always equals
g(mS) = g(mB). Intuitively, thus, the split of one region into two produces
a higher knowledge output. However, Figure 2 does not really account for
public knowledge transmission (and the resulting increase in individual stocks
of knowledge), so the calculations proving this are a bit more intricate. To be
precise, we introduce:
Denition: A stationary state in the two-region system is called welfare
improving when the associated knowledge growth rate for each individual is
higher than that at the initial one-region state.
Based on this denition, we have the following result.
Proposition 2: There is a nonempty, open set of exogenous parameters
for which there exists a welfare improving myopic core stationary state (The
New Eden) of the following form:
1. Each individual engages in both inter-regional and intra-regional pairwise
interaction. The proportion of time each individual spends interacting
with members of their own region is denoted by ' ( 0 < ' < 1). Thus,
the proportion of time each individual spends interacting with members
of the other region is 1  '.
2. Inter-regional interaction takes place in groups only. All inter-regional
working groups have the same composition, namely the same number N
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of members from each region. (Please refer to Figure 3.) Formally, if
 i = f iA; iBg is the inter-regional working group for i 2 A, the size of
 iA is the same as the size of  iB, namely N.
3. Inter-regional interactions take the following form: For i 2 A and j 2
B,
j 2  iB =) mdij = mB and ij =
1  '
N
j =2  iB =) mdij > mB and ij = 0
(Please refer to Figures 2 and 3.) That is, for inter-regional interactions,
a person spends an equal amount of time with every person from the
other region in their working group, maintaining knowledge di¤erential
at the bliss point. A person spends no time working with people from the
other region who are not in their working group since the corresponding
productivity is lower than at the bliss point.
4. Intra-regional interactions take the following form: For i; j 2 A, dening
mS as in equation (41):
j =2  iA =) mdij = mS and ij =
'
N  N
j 2  iA =) mdij < mS and ij = 0
(Please refer to Figure 2.) A person spends an equal amount of time
with every person from their own region not in their inter-regional work-
ing group, maintaining knowledge di¤erential at the point where pairwise
productivity is the same as the bliss point for inter-regional production.
That is, for intra-regional interactions, a person spends no time working
with people from their own region who are in their inter-regional working
group since the corresponding productivity is lower than at the bliss point.
5. At the New Eden, the dynamics for ni are given by:
_ni
ni
= g
 
mS
  [2 + C] for i 2 A [B (52)
Since maut < m
S < mB, in comparison with (51), it follows that the
knowledge growth rate is higher at the New Eden than under autarky.
FIGURES 2 AND 3 GO HERE
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In order to have a New Eden, it is obvious from Figure 2 that exogenous
parameters must satisfy:
mJ < maut 
1
2 + C
2
< mS (53)
or equivalently:
 < g(maut) < g(m
B)  g(mS) (54)
In terms of the original parameters, (54) means
 <   (
C
2
)
1 + C
2
<       (1  )1  (55)
Thus, in the rest of this section, we always assume that condition (53), (54),
or (55) holds. Condition (55) holds when  is su¢ ciently small whereas C is
su¢ ciently large.
The proof of Proposition 2 including Lemmas A1-A5 can be found in Ap-
pendix 2.
Now that we have conrmed that the New Eden exists, we turn next to
characterizing further the New Eden. First we derive the iso-N curves for Fig-
ure 4. That is, we derive the parameter combinations that generate the same
inter-regional working group size N at the steady state. For convenience, we
give these parameter combinations in terms of mS and mB.12 Referring to
Section 8.4.5 in the Technical Appendix, we nd that:
mS = mS(mB; N) = (56)
N 
h
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  1 e
1+e 

C
2
+ C !
C
i
+mB + 2(1 m
B) !
C
N 
h
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  1 e
1+e 

C
2
+ (2 + C
2
)  C !
C
i
+ (2 + C
2
) 
h
mB + 2(1 m
B) !
C
i
where
 !
C is given by (22):
 !
C =
(
C  N
N
for N < N
C for N  N
For any xed N > 0, equation (56) denes an iso-N curve in mB  mS
space. Notice from (56) that iso-N curves are independent of parameter  .
Figure 4 shows examples of iso-N curves under various values of N, where
12The explicit solution of N in terms of the original parameters is given by Lemma A3
in Appendix 2.
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relevant parameters are xed at C = C = 32, e = 0 and N = 100.13 The
main characteristics of iso-N curves that can be observed from Figure 4 are
summarized in Lemma 1, which can readily be derived from equation (56).
FIGURE 4 GOES HERE
Lemma 1. The iso-N curves dened by (56) have the following character-
istics:
(i) As N approaches 0, the iso-N curve becomes a horizontal line at
height maut:
lim
N!0
mS(mB; N) =
1
2 + C
2
= maut
(ii) As N approaches 1, the iso-N curve becomes
bmS(mB)  lim
N!1
mS(mB; N)
=
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  1 e
1+e   C2 + CC 
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  1 e
1+e   C2 + CC  (2 + C2 ) (57)
called the supreme iso-N curve.
(iii) All iso-N curves pass through the common point, (mB;mS) = (mB;maut),
where
mB  1 +
C
2
 1 e
1+e
2 + C
1+e (58)
When C is xed, mB decreases continuously in e such that at the boundaries:
mB =
1
2
when e = 0, (59)
mB =
1
2 + C
2
= maut when e = 1 (60)
(iv) Each iso-N curve is downward sloping and strictly concave on (0; 1=2).
(v) Except at mB, the iso-N curve shifts continuously upward as N in-
creases from 0 to 1.
By denition, no point (mB;mS) above the supreme iso-N curve is attain-
able as a stationary state myopic core point. Furthermore, no point (mB;mS)
above the diagonal mS = mB line or below the horizontal mS = maut line
13In Figure 7, the iso-N curve when N = N = 100 and the iso-N curve when N =1
are indistinguishable, and thus both the curves are represented by the same bold curve.
Mathematically speaking, however, we can readily see from (56) that except at mB = 0:5,
the iso-N curve continuously shifts upward as N increases from N to 1.
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is attainable as a stationary state myopic core point. Thus, the domain of
mB mS space that is attainable as a New Eden is limited to the interior of
the triangle delineated by the supreme N-curve and the two lines mS = mB
and mS = maut. In order to investigate how this feasible domain changes with
parameters, rst let us focus on the e¤ects of parameter e (the measure of ease
of public knowledge transmission between regions) on the supreme N-curve.
Setting C = C = 32, Figure 5 shows how the supreme iso-N curve changes as
parameter e increases from 0 to 1. Using (57), we can readily generalize the
key characteristics of supreme iso-N curves as follows:
FIGURE 5 GOES HERE
Lemma 2. When e changes parametrically while C and C are xed, supreme
iso-N curves dened by (57) have the following characteristics:
(i) All supreme iso-N curves pass through the common point, (mB;mS) =
(maut;m
S), where
mS 
C
2
+ C
C
C
2
+ C
C
 (2 + C
2
)
(61)
When C is xed, mS increases continuously in C  C such that
mS =
1
2 + C
2
= maut when C = 0
mS =
1
2
when C = C.
(ii) For any 0  e < 1, the supreme iso-N curve is downward sloping and
strictly concave.
(iii) Except at mS, the supreme iso-N curve shifts continuously leftward
as e increases from 0 towards 1; in the limit, it becomes the vertical line:
mB = maut = 1=

2 + C
2

.
As we can see from Figure 5, the domain that is attainable as a New Eden
is nonempty as long as e < 1 and mS > maut. Since
mS  maut =
C
2
 (1 + C
2
)
C
2
+ C
C
 (2 + C
2
)
the condition mS > maut always holds provided that C > 0. Hence, we can
conclude as follows:
Lemma 3. In mBmS space, the domain that is attainable as a stationary
state myopic core point is not empty if and only if e < 1 and C > 0.
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However, when e approaches 1, or when C approaches 0, the domain for a
New Eden disappears in the limit. In other words, when there is no discount
in the inter-regional transfer of public knowledge (i.e., e = 1), or when there
is no within group externality for the inter-regional interactions in knowledge
creation (i.e., C = 0), it is impossible to attain a New Eden.
Given that we have characterized N, we can now characterize ' in terms
of N. As shown in Appendix 2:
' = 1  2
C  N
N
 (2 +
C
2
) mS   1
1 mS for N
 < N , (62)
' = 1  2
C
 (2 +
C
2
) mS   1
1 mS for N
  N (63)
It can be readily conrmed that 0 < ' < 1. One interesting question
concerns how  a¤ects the value of '. We shall return to this question shortly,
after Lemma 4.
Although Lemma 3 gives the domain for a possible New Eden in mB mS
space, the feasible combinations of mB and mS are actually uniquely dened
by (41). In order to see the relationship between mB and mS in terms of the
original parameters, let us rewrite (41) explicitly:
(1  2mS)  (mS)1 
1 mS =  
(1  2mB)  (mB)1 
1 mB , m
S < mB (64)
In turn, the bliss point mB is uniquely dened by  from (40); or, solving (40)
for ,
 =
1  2mB
1 mB for 0 < m
B <
1
2
(65)
Hence, substituting (65) for  in (64), for any xed value of  2 (0; 1), equations
(64) and (65) together dene the feasible relationship between mB and mS as
a unique curve in mB mS space, which is called an iso- curve.
Figure 6 shows numerical examples of iso- curves. Intuitively, low 
means that the discount in productivity for working with a person in the other
region, compared to working with a person in the home region, is large. For
example, travel costs are high. A value of  close to 1 means that there isnt
much di¤erence in productivity or cost for working with a person in the other
region compared to the home region. This graph shows that as  moves from
0 to 1, for a given person in region A, the knowledge di¤erential between that
person and potential partners in the home and the other region become close.
Of course, when  = 1, there is no di¤erence between partners in the home
and away regions, so mS = mB and this is represented by the upward sloping
45 line.
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FIGURE 6 GOES HERE
Using (64) and (65), we can readily generalize the main characteristics of
iso- curves as follows:
Lemma 4. When  2 (0; 1) changes parametrically, iso- curves dened by
(64) and (65) have the following characteristics:
(i) All iso- curves pass through the origin.
(ii) Each iso- curve is strictly convex and tangent to the vertical line at
mB = 1
2
; in the limit
mS =

1 + 
at mB =
1
2
(66)
(iii) Except at the origin, the iso- curve shifts continuously upward as 
increases from 0 towards 1; in the limit, it coincides with the upward sloping
diagonal line.
Concerning the previous question about the impact of the value of  on
', along the supreme iso-N curve (for example), we can see that as mB
increases, mS decreases and thus, applying equation (63), ' must increase.
In combination with Figures 4 and 6,  must decrease along this curve. In
short, as inter-regional interaction becomes more costly, the equilibrium path
features less inter-regional interaction.
With this preparation, we can describe Figure 7 next. To be concrete, let
us choose a set of parameters as follows:
C = C = 32, e = 0, N = 100 (67)
Then, using (57), we can draw the supreme iso-N curve (N =1) as in Figure
7. Also, using (50), the maut-line can be drawn as in Figure 7. Thus, we
describe the domain of possible stationary state myopic core points as a large
triangle delineated by the supreme iso-N curve, the maut-line and the upward
sloping diagonal line. Choose any point inside this triangle, for example, point
a which is at the intersection of the iso- curve with  = 0:9 and the vertical
line at mB = 0:3. From (65), mB = 0:3 means  = 4=7; thus point a in Figure
7 corresponds to the parameters
 = 0:9 and  = 4=7 (68)
In turn, the equilibrium group size N is determined by the iso-N = 30 curve
passing through point a. In this way, the set of parameters, (67) and (68),
uniquely determines the New Eden as a stationary state myopic core point.
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At point a, since mS = 0:186 > maut = 0:056, we have from (52) that
Knowledge growth rate at the New Eden
Knowledge growth rate under autarchy
=
g(mS)
g(maut)
=
:45799
:28778
= 1:5915
implying a large improvement in welfare.
FIGURE 7 GOES HERE
As another example of a New Eden, while holding xed the parameters in
(67), let us change (68) as follows:
 = 0:606,  = 0:245
Then, since mB = 0:43 from (40), we have that
Knowledge growth rate at the New Eden
Knowledge growth rate under autarchy
=
g(mS)
g(maut)
=
0:347
0:117
= 2:97
Thus, by breaking the one region into two, the new myopic core steady state
achieves a knowledge growth rate almost 3 times higher than the one region
economy.
So in practical terms, when is the New Eden, the myopic core steady state
generated by splitting one region into two, a big improvement over the one
region case? To answer this question, notice that from equation (51) for
the one region situation and from equation (52) for the two region situation,
the potential improvement in K-productivity is completely determined by the
size of g(maut) for the one region case relative to the size of g(m
S) =  
g(mB) in the two region case. This comparison can be seen in terms of
exogenous parameters in equation (55) by taking the ratio of the two sides
of the inequality. We focus on the most favorable cases for the New Eden,
namely from Lemma 2: e = 0 and C = C. Referring to Figure 7, for each
point (mB;mS) in Figure 7, we examine the ratio of the knowledge productivity
in the New Eden compared to autarky. The most favorable case is the upper
envelope of the domain of possible stationary state myopic core points. As is
apparent in Figure 7, the upper envelope consists of two parts: the upward
sloping diagonal mS = mB up to the intersection with the supreme iso-N
curve, and the supreme iso-N curve to the right of the intersection point.
There are two cases to consider. First, for the upward sloping diagonal in
Figure 7, since mS = mB,  = 1. Hence, the ratio of interest along this
segment is:
E(;C)  g(m
B)
g(maut)
=
  (1  )1 
(C
2
)
1+C
2
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For the second case along the supreme iso-N curve, in equation (57), settinge = 0, C = C, and mB = 1 
2  ,
E(;C)  g(bmS(mB))
g(maut)
=
 
1 + C
2
  (1  )  1	   1 + C
2
   + 1	1  
C
2

Figure 8 illustrates E(;C) as a function of  where C takes on values 8, 16,
and 32.14
FIGURE 8 GOES HERE
For each xed C, the function E is single peaked, and the maximum is
attained along the supreme iso-N curve rather than along the upward sloping
diagonal. For C = 8, the maximum is attained at  = :252 with E = 1:67;
for C = 16, the maximum is attained at :262 with E = 2:23; for C = 32, the
maximum is attained at  = :256 with E = 3:21.15 Notice that the optimal
value of  seems to be stable at around :25 when the values of C vary.
Summarizing this analysis, we can conclude that given an initial situation
where there is a high degree of homogeneity in workers, division into two re-
gions will result in a big improvement in knowledge productivity when: 1)
Inter-regional public knowledge transmission is weak (e is small, since this
promotes inter-regional knowledge di¤erentiation); 2) Public knowledge trans-
mission within each inter-regional working group is e¤ective, so workers can
di¤erentiate themselves from others in the same region rapidly (C is large);
3) Heterogeneity (as opposed to homogeneity) of workersknowledge bases is
important in the production function for partnerships, so diversity increases
productivity ( is small);16 4) The within-region public information transmis-
sion technology is very e¤ective (C is large) so that autarky is unproductive.
14Along the supreme iso-N segment, we have neglected  . Given mB and thus , the
parameter  is completely determined by mS , as illustrated in Figure 7, but its calculation
is di¢ cult.
15The corresponding values of  are: for C = 8,  = :834; for C = 16,  = :76; for
C = 32,  = :679.
16When  is too small (to the left of the peak of E), knowledge workers try to avoid
building up knowledge in common with any of their partners. If the intra-regional public
knowledge transmission technology and the inter-regional working group public knowledge
transmission technology are at all e¤ective, it is hard to avoid building up knowledge in
common with active partners. Thus, productivity will be lower than for values of  closer
to the peak.
34
4.3 The Transition Process
Up to this point, in this section we have studied the properties of two myopic
core steady states: rst with one region, and then with two regions. In this
short subsection, we shall discuss the transition, according to the story of
the Tower of Babel, from a lower knowledge productivity steady state with
one region to a higher knowledge productivity steady state with two regions.
There are two transition phases between the steady states.
First, the one region autarkic economy is split into two regions. This is
illustrated in Figure 9.
FIGURE 9 GOES HERE
Immediately after the division, for a given person in region A, the relative
knowledge di¤erentiation of potential partners in A and potential partners in
B is essentially the same. However, the cost of working with a partner in
region B is higher, since  < 1. Thus, people in each region work only with
partners in their own region. However, people in the two regions become
di¤erentiated from each other over time. Given that N is large, and that
people are working only with partners in the same region, they will work
with all others in the region for a small amount of time, the same for every
partnership. They maintain the same knowledge di¤erentiation with their
active partners, namely they stay at maut. In this phase, the two regions
are endogenously developing di¤erent areas of expertise due to the barriers to
contact between regions.
The regions continue in an autarkic mode until the regions are su¢ ciently
di¤erentiated, featuring the same productivity for potential partners in their
own region and in the other region. Then the second transition phase begins.
This is illustrated in Figure 10.
FIGURE 10 GOES HERE
At this time, a person in region A begins to participate in an inter-regional
working group, as described in the previous subsection for the nal steady
state, and with people in their own region who are not in their inter-regional
working group, also as described in the previous subsection for the nal steady
state. However, the size of the inter-regional working group, N, and the total
time spent working with partners in the home region, ', will not be the same
as at the steady state. The reason is that people do not want to maintain
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the bliss point, since they havent reached it yet, but rather wish to move
to the right, increasing both di¤erentiation relative to active partners as well
as productivity as fast as possible. In order to avoid building up knowledge
in common with workers from the other region in their inter-regional working
group (and thus slowing the rate of increase of productivity), they want to make
their inter-regional working group as large as possible subject to feasibility,
namely N = N
2
. Finally, when they reach the bliss point for their partners
from the other region in their inter-regional working group, they shift to N
and ' that will maintain the bliss point.
Other transition processes are possible, but we stick to a description of a
simple one.
5 Conclusions
We have endeavored to clarify a second role of spatial distance in the econ-
omy beyond the rst and obvious role of creating a barrier to the exchange
of commodities between locations. This second role is the propagation of
the di¤erentiation of agents themselves, in the sense that they form separate
cultures. It can result in an increase in knowledge productivity in the entire
economy relative to the situation when there is no spatial distance between
agents. The key to this increase is in the ability of inter-regional working
groups to form and to further di¤erentiate agents residing in the same region
due to knowledge spillovers within the inter-regional working group.
At this point, it is useful to remark on the role of population size, called
N or 2N , in the model. This exogenous parameter plays an important but
implicit role in the basic setup of the model, for example in equations (23)-
(32), where sums are taken over residents of one or both regions. However,
it is very important to notice that our main results tell us the characteristics
of equilibrium are scale free, namely independent of population size. This
can be seen, for example, in equations (51) and (52), that are independent
of population. For a detailed discussion of why the model is scale free, see
Berliant and Fujita (2011, p. 859). In general, we require a large enough
population and symmetric regions in order to simplify calculations.
An interesting alternative interpretation of our model is: Rather than using
A and B to denote regions, instead they denote di¤erent ethnic groups in the
same region. Then, although communication between ethnicities is more
di¢ cult than within the same ethnicity, knowledge productivity is higher due
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to diversity. This interpretation ties nicely into Ottaviano and Peri (2006,
2008).
Our analysis has implications for the impact of the recent rapid develop-
ment in information technology on the rate of global knowledge productivity.
Faster knowledge transmission due to improved information technology evi-
dently makes the dissemination of new ideas more rapid, but it also tends to
create more homogeneity in the knowledge bases of researchers. Di¤erentia-
tion of researchers through the formation of inter-regional working groups can
help to turn this disadvantage to an advantage. Generally speaking, location
and knowledge creation are intertwined; for example, see Duranton and Puga
(2001) and Helsley and Strange (2004).
A natural but di¢ cult extension of our model would introduce migration
of researchers between regions, providing another way to circulate knowledge.
Regarding migration, the role of immigration policy and of the educational
systems in various countries would be a topic worthy of further exploration.
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Figure 1: The intra-regional
K-productivity curve g(m) and the
inter-regional K-productivity curve
  g(m) with the same bliss point mB.
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Figure 2: The New Eden: Achieving
high K-productivity though diverse
cultures.
Group 1 (size 2N  )*
Group 3 (size 2N  )*
Group 2 (size 2N  )*
Group 4 (size 2N  )*
i A
j B
Figure 3: Inter-regional interactions at
the New Eden: Tables at a Chinese
restaurant.
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Figure 4: Iso-N curves (C = C = 32,e = 0, N = 100, maut = 0:056,
mB = 0:50): curves are N = 0
(horizontal), 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70,
80, 90, 100 (top)
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Figure 8:
E(;C) = Knowledge growth rate at the New EdenKnowledge growth rate under autarchy
as a function of  for C = 32 (top), C = 16,
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6 Appendix 1
6.1 Justication of the Knowledge Absorption Function
It is natural to assume that public knowledge transmission between regions is
not as e¤ective as public knowledge transmission within a region. To make
this notion precise, we must di¤erentiate between public knowledge produced
by partnerships consisting of two K-workers in the same region, two from
the other region, one from each region, and one from each region that are
members of the same inter-regional working group. The one region model
will be a special case where parameters are set so that there are no frictions
between the two regions. Consider the following equalities: for i 2 A
C 
0@ii  aii + X
j2A i
ij  (aij=2)
1A =     [IAA  X
j2A
ij  aij] + e  IBB!
(69)
where 0  e < 1
and for i 2 A
bC  X
j2B
ij  (aij=2)
!
= b    IAB  X
j2B
ij  aij
!
(70)
 !
C 
 X
j2 iB
ij  (aij=2)
!
=  !   
 
I i  
X
j2 iB
ij  aij
!
(71)
where bC + !C = C (72)
 !
C =
(
C  N
N
for N < N
C for N  N (73)
First we give the idea behind the overall structure of this system, and
then we proceed to discuss in detail each component equation. For the pur-
pose of explanation, consider the case where the day is divided into two sub-
periods. The length of these time periods is determined endogenously; this
will eventually be represented by ' for intra-regional interactions and 1  '
for inter-regional interactions, under the symmetric interactions case. The
rst subperiod features only intra-regional interaction, whereas the second has
only inter-regional interaction. The inter-regional interaction time is further
divided into time spent with persons generally from the other region, and time
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spent specically with ones inter-regional interaction group. Associated with
each subperiod are externalities, namely knowledge absorbed from the partners
one is working with in general, at the time knowledge creation takes place.
To be specic, when a person is working with a partner in their own region,
they naturally absorb a proportion of the total knowledge created in their home
region at that time. At the same time, they also absorb a (lesser) proportion
of the ideas created in the other region.
When a person is working with a partner from another region, they absorb
a di¤erent proportion of the all the new ideas created by inter-regional interac-
tions at that time. This proportion is potentially di¤erent from the absorption
rate from the intra-regional externality absorption rate. At the same time,
when a person is working with others in their inter-regional working groups,
they absorb a proportion of the new ideas created within that working group
at that time.
For all but the inter-regional working group externality, the knowledge ab-
sorbed through the externality becomes knowledge in common for the workers
in the same region. In contrast, the inter-regional working group externality
is entirely di¤erent. Ideas learned through the inter-regional working group
externality become knowledge in common for only the members of the specic
working group. That is, these ideas are not learned by persons in a region
who are not members of the same working group, and thus they become part
of the di¤erential knowledge between members of that inter-regional working
group and everyone else.
We shall explain the content of these equations piece by piece. On the
right hand side of equation (69), the term in brackets IAA  
PN
j=1 ij  aij
represents the new knowledge produced in region A in the rst sub-period
that does not involve partnerships including K-worker i. Since IBB represents
new knowledge created in the rst sub-period by partnerships involving only
workers in B, we discount it by e due to friction (lost in translation). Recall
that  gives the rate at which new ideas are patented, whereas  gives the rate
at which publicly revealed ideas can be absorbed by a K-worker. Therefore
the right hand side of the equation represents the public knowledge revealed
by patents that is absorbed by K-worker i in the rst sub-period. The term in
brackets on the left hand side represents new knowledge created by K-worker
i at an instant in the rst sub-period. In total, the equation means that the
new public knowledge that can be absorbed by K-worker i is proportional to
their capacity to produce new ideas. In essence, this is due to the constraint
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on their time and the productivity of their e¤ort both to absorb new ideas and
to produce them.
Equation (70) represents the analogous equation for inter-regional part-
nerships in the second sub-period. The interpretation of this equation is
analogous to the previous one. But there is an additional implicit assump-
tion when we write these two equations, (69) and (70), separately. That is,
we assume that public knowledge produced by inter-regional partnerships is
complementary to (in contrast to substitutes with) knowledge produced by
intra-regional partnerships.
Equation (71) represents the analogous equation for partnerships from per-
son is inter-regional working group in the second sub-period. The right hand
term in brackets I i  
P
j2 iB ij  aij represents the total knowledge produced
by partnerships in person is inter-regional working group that do not involve
partnerships including K-worker i. Recall that  gives the rate at which new
ideas are patented, whereas ! gives the rate at which publicly revealed ideas
within the inter-regional working group can be absorbed by a K-worker. The
term in brackets on the left hand side represents new knowledge created by
K-worker i in inter-regional working group partnerships at an instant. The
equation says that the rate of public knowledge absorption from person is
inter-regional working group is proportional to their capacity to produce new
ideas with working group partners from the other region.17
For equation (72), attention is divided into the two sources of inter-regional
externalities, namely the attention to the externality bC from general inter-
regional partners and the attention to the externality
 !
C from partners in ones
inter-regional working group. The total attention bC + !C that each person
devotes to inter-regional externalities is equal to the total learning capacity C,
which is the same as the constant in equation (69). As explained in equation
(73),
 !
C and hence bC are endogenous variables determined by working group
size N.
Equation (73) says that the larger the working group, the more attention is
paid to the externality from the working group of size N. Consequently, less
attention is paid to the general externality from inter-regional partnerships.
Beyond group size N , the e¤ect of group size on attention is attenuated.
To provide more intuition and useful expressions for the analysis in the
17It is possible to have intra-regional working groups that are the intra-regional analogs
of equation (71). However, this only serves to make people in the same region more similar,
and this does not improve welfare. In other words, such groups would not be used in the
myopic core.
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main text of the paper, we consider a special case with symmetric knowledge
composition: ni = n for all i and mdij = m
d for i 6= j in the same region,
whereas mdij = m
d
AB for i and j in di¤erent regions.
18
P
k2A i ij = ' for all
i 2 A,Pk2B i ij = ' for all i 2 B and g(md) =   g(mdAB) > . In this case,
ii = 0 for all i, and aij = n  2  g(md) for all i 6= j. Hence, in (69), using (23)
to (25),
ii  aii +
X
j2A i
ij  (aij=2) = '  n  g(md)
IAA  
X
j2A
ij  aij + e  IBB   '  2  g(md) + e N  n  g(md)
= N  '  n  g(md)  '  n  2g(md) + e N  '  n  g(md)
Thus,
 =
C

 '  n  g(m
d)
'  (N   2)  n  g(md) + '  e N  n  g(md)
=
C

 1
(N   2) + e N
=
C

 1
(N   1)  (1 + e)  (1  e)
 C
(N   1) 
1
1 + e
The reason N   1 appears in the denominator here is because the externality
excludes ideas produced by oneself, in particular for the externality in ones
home region. However, for the externality from the other region, there is no
need to exclude ideas produced by oneself. Thus, N appears instead of N   1
in the denominator.
For notational convenience, we dene:
e  e = C
N
 e
1 + e
that represents the absorption rate for the knowledge externality from region
B.
In the context of the same example, in equation (70) we have:X
j2B
ij  (aij=2) = (1  ')    n  2g(md)=2
= (1  ')  n  g(md)
18A slight generalization of this example applies on the myopic core path, as explained in
Section 4.
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IAB  
X
j2B
ij  aij = N  (1  ')    n  2g(mdAB)  (1  ')    n  2g(mdAB)
= 2(N   1)  (1  ')  n  2g(md)
Hence,
b = bC

 (1  ')  n  g(m
d)
2(N   1)  (1  ')  n  g(md)
=
bC

 1
2(N   1)
Once again, in the context of the same example, in equation (71),X
j2 iB
ij  (aij=2) = (1  ')  N

N
   n  2g(md)=2
= (1  ')  N

N
   n  g(md)
I i  
X
j2 iB
ij  aij = N  (1  ')  N

N
   n  2g(mdAB)  (1  ') 
N
N
   n  2g(mdAB)
= 2(N   1)  (1  ')    N

N
 n  g(md)
Hence,
 ! =
 !
C

 (1  ') 
N
N
   n  g(md)
2(N   1)  (1  ')    N
N
 n  g(md)
=
 !
C

 1
2(N   1)
In conclusion, assuming N is su¢ ciently large, we employ the following
specications:
 =
C
(N   1) 
1
1 + e
e  e = C
N
 e
1 + e
b = bC
  2(N   1)
 ! =
 !
C
2(N   1)
where 0  e < 1,
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bC + !C = C
and
 !
C =
(
C  N
N
for N < N
C for N  N
6.2 Basic Dynamics Without Symmetry
In this appendix, we summarize the dynamics of ni andmdij (i; j = 1; 2;    ; 2N).
First, using (26), we have (see Technical Appendix b)
For i 2 A:
_ni
ni
= (1    )  [ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  2G
 
mdij;m
d
ji

] + (1  b  ) X
j2B
ij    2G
 
mdij;m
d
ji

+    [
X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
 + (
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk)]
+e    [X
k2B
kk  nk
ni
 + (
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk)]
+b    [X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk]
+ !  [
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk  X
j2 iB
ij    2G
 
mdij;m
d
ji

] (74)
Next, by denition,
_mdij =
d
 
ndij=n
ij

dt
=
_ndij
nij
  n
d
ij
nij
 _n
ij
nij
=
_ndij
nij
 mdij 
_nij
nij
=
_ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
=
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
(75)
Using this identity, for each di¤erent combination of i and j, we can obtain
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the dynamics _mdij as follows (see Technical Appendix c):
For i 2 A, j 2 A:
for j 2  iA, _mdij =
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
= (1 mdij)(1 mdji)
8<:(1    )  [ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
)
 mdij  (1 mdji)
(
(1    )  ij  2G(mdij;mdji)
+   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
+ ! 
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
)
 mdij 
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1    )  [jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
(76)
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For i 2 A, j 2 A:
for j =2  iA, _mdij =
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
= (1 mdij)(1 mdji)
8<:(1    )  [ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
+ ! 
 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
!)
 mdij  (1 mdji)
(
(1    )  ij  2G(mdij;mdji)
+   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
+ ! 
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
)
 mdij 
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1    )  [jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
+ ! 
0@X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl  nk
nj
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
1A9=;
(77)
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For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j 2  iB, _mdij =
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
= (1 mdij)(1 mdji)
8<:(1  e  )  [ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik    2G(mdik;mdki) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
359=;
 mdij  (1 mdji)
(
(1  b  )  ij    2G(mdij;mdji)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk  ij    2G  mdij;mdji)
)
 mdij 
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1  e  )  [jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2A i
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2B
kk  nk
nj
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
nj
G(mdkl;mdlk)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
359=;
(78)
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For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j =2  iB, _mdij =
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
= (1 mdij)(1 mdji)
8<:(1  e  )  [ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik    2G(mdik;mdki) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl  nk
nj
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj))
9=;
 mdij  (1 mdji)
(
(1  b  )  ij    2G(mdij;mdji)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk  ij    2G  mdij;mdji)
)
 mdij 
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1  e  )  [jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2A i
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2B
kk  nk
nj
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
nj
G(mdkl;mdlk)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl  nk
nj
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj))
9=;
(79)
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6.3 Basic Dynamics Under Symmetry
When condition (34) holds, using (36) and (33), the dynamics (74) can be
written as
For i 2 A: (80)
_ni
ni
= (1    )  [ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  2g
 
mdij

] + (1  b  ) X
j2B
ij    2g
 
mdij

+    [
X
k2A i
kk  + (
X
k2A i
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl

)]
+e    [X
k2B
kk  + (
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl

)]
+b    [X
k2A i
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

]
+ !  [
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g
 
mdkl
  X
j2 iB
ij    2g
 
mdij

]
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Likewise, the dynamics (76) to (79), respectively, can be written as follows:
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j 2  iA, (81)
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1 mdji)
8<:(1    )  [ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2g(mdik)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
ik    2g(mdik)
)
 mdij 
(
(1    )  ij  2g(mdij)
+   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

+ ! 
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g
 
mdkl
)
 mdij 
8<:(1    )  [jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
jk    2g(mdjk)
)
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For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j =2  iA, (82)
_mdij
(1 mdij)
= (1 mdji)
8<:(1    )  [ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2g(mdik)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
ik    2g(mdik)
+ ! 
 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2g(mdik)
!)
 mdij 
(
(1    )  ij  2g(mdij)
+   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl
)
 mdij 
8<:(1    )  [jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
jk    2g(mdjk)
+ ! 
0@X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2g(mdjk)
1A9=;
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For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j 2  iB, (83)
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1 mdji)
8<:(1  e  )  [ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik    2g(mdik) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2A
kk  
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g(mdkl)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)
359=;
 mdij
(
(1  b  )  ij    2g(mdij)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g
 
mdkl
  ij    2g  mdij)
)
 mdij 
8<:(1  e  )  [jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2A i
jk    2g(mdjk) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2B
kk  
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g(mdkl)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)
359=;
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For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j =2  iB, (84)
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1 mdji)
8<:(1  e  )  [ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik    2g(mdik) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2A
kk  
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g(mdkl)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2g(mdjk))
)
 mdij 
(
(1  b  )  ij    2g(mdij)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl
)
 mdij 
8<:(1  e  )  [jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2A i
jk    2g(mdjk) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2B
kk  
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g(mdkl)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2g(mdjk))
9=;
Assuming that N is su¢ ciently large, we use the following approximations:
1      1, 1  e    1, 1  b    1
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Plugging these into equations (80) - (84), we obtain:
For i 2 A: (85)
_ni
ni
= [ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  2g
 
mdij

] +
X
j2B
ij    2g
 
mdij

+    [
X
k2A i
kk  + (
X
k2A i
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl

)]
+e    [X
k2B
kk  + (
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl

)]
+b    [X
k2A i
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

]
+ !  [
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g
 
mdkl
  X
j2 iB
ij    2g
 
mdij

]
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j 2  iA, (86)
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1 mdji)
8<:[ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2g(mdik)]
+
X
k2B
ik    2g(mdik)
)
 mdij 
(
ij  2g(mdij)
+   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

+ ! 
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g
 
mdkl
)
 mdij 
8<:[jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+
X
k2B
jk    2g(mdjk)
)
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For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j =2  iA, (87)
_mdij
(1 mdij)
= (1 mdji)
8<:[ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2g(mdik)]
+
X
k2B
ik    2g(mdik)
+ ! 
 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2g(mdik)
!)
 mdij 
(
ij  2g(mdij)
+   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl
)
 mdij 
8<:[jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+
X
k2B
jk    2g(mdjk)
+ ! 
0@X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2g(mdjk)
1A9=;
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For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j 2  iB, (88)
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1 mdji)
8<:[ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)]
+
X
k2B j
ik    2g(mdik) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2A
kk  
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g(mdkl)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)
359=;
 mdij
(
ij    2g(mdij)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g
 
mdkl
  ij    2g  mdij)
)
 mdij 
8<:[jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+
X
k2A i
jk    2g(mdjk) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2B
kk  
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g(mdkl)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)
359=;
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For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j =2  iB, (89)
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1 mdji)
8<:[ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)]
+
X
k2B j
ik    2g(mdik) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2A
kk  
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g(mdkl)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2g(mdjk))
)
 mdij 
(
ij    2g(mdij)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl
)
 mdij 
8<:[jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+
X
k2A i
jk    2g(mdjk) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2B
kk  
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g(mdkl)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2g(mdjk))
9=;
7 Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2, we nd the stationary state of the form given in
Proposition 2 that is consistent with the maximization of individual income.
For each i 2 A, the dynamics  _mdij	2Nj=1 take the following form, namely that
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of a stationary state attaining the New Eden:
mdij = m
S for i; j 2 A, j =2  iA (90)
mdij = m
d
ji = m
d < mS for i; j 2 A, j 2  iA (91)
mdij = m
B for i 2 A; j 2 B; j 2  iB (92)
mdij > m
B for i 2 A; j 2 B; j 2  iB (93)
Then, under condition (54), maximizing income yi dened by (42) yields
ii = 0 for i 2 A (94)
ij = 0 for i; j 2 A, j 2  iA (95)
ij = 0 for i 2 A, j 2 B, j =2  iB (96)
In order to get the equilibrium values of fijg2Nj=1 that are not shown in (94)
to (96) above, let us focus on a specic person, i 2 A, and assume that
For i 2 A:X
j2A i
ij =
X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij = 'i (97)X
j2B
ij =
X
j2 iB
ij = 1  'i (98)X
l2A
kl =
X
l2A k
kl =
X
l2A, l =2 kA
kl = '
 for k 2 A i (99)X
l2B
kl =
X
l2B k
kl =
X
l2B, l =2 kB
kl = '
 for k 2 B (100)
X
l2B
kl =
X
l2B k
kl = 1  ' for k 2 A i (101)X
l2B
kl =
X
l2 iB
kl = 1  ' for k 2  iA, k 6= i (102)
That is, except for person i 2 A, all persons are assumed to have chosen
symmetrically the equilibrium values of fklg in the form of (99) to (102). We
then investigate below: For what values of ' will the equilibrium value of 'i
coincide with '.
Using the specication (90) to (102) above, the terms inside the square
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brackets of the income equation (42) for i 2 A simplify as follows:
ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  g(mdij) = ii  +
X
j2 iA, j 6=i
ij  g(mdij) +
X
j2A i, j =2 iA
ij  g(mdij)
= 0 + 0 + (
X
j2A i, j =2 iA
ij)  g(mS)
= 'i  g(mS)
X
j2B
ij    g(mdij) =
X
j2 iB
ij    g(mdij) +
X
j2B, j =2 iB
ij    g(mdij)
= (
X
j2 iB
ij)    g(mB) + 0
= (1  'i)  g(mS)
Thus, the income equation becomes
yi =     ni  ['i  g(mS) + (1  'i)  g(mS)]
=     ni  g(mS)
that is independent of the choice variables fijg2Nj=1 of person i. Therefore,
we consider the change in income, equation (43), as the objective function for
person i:
_yi = f _    ni +    _nig  (103)
[ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  g(mdij) +
X
j2B
ij    g(mdij)]
+    ni[
X
j2A i
ij  g0(mdij)  _mdij +
X
j2B
ij    g0(mdij)  _mdij]
= f _    ni +    _nig  g(mS)
+    ni  Fi
where
Fi 
X
j2A i
ij  g0(mdij)  _mdij +
X
j2B
ij    g0(mdij)  _mdij (104)
In order to evaluate this equation, as shown in Section 8.4.1 in the Technical
Appendix, we obtain the following dynamics of ni and mdij:
For i 2 A: (105)
_ni = ni  g
 
mS
  [2 + C]
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For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j 2  iA, (106)
_mdij = (1 md)  2g(mS) 
(
1  (2 + C
2
) md  md 
"  !
C
2(N   1)  (1  'i)
#)
where mdij = m
d
ji = m
d
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j =2  iA, (107)
_mdij = (1 mS)  2g(mS) 
(
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
 (1 mS)  ij
	
where mdij = m
d
ji = m
S
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j 2  iB, (108)
_mdij = (1 mB)  2g(mS) 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
 (1 mB)  ij  mB   !  (1  'i   ij)
	
where mdij = m
d
ji = m
B, and g(mS) =   g(mB)
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j =2  iB, (109)
_mdij = (1 md)  2g(mS) (
1  (2 + C
2
) md + (1 md) 
"
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  ' +
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
#
 md   !  (1  'i)

where mdij = m
d
ji = m
d, and g(mS) =   g(mB)
Since from (105), _ni is independent of the choice variables of person i, the
only term remaining from the expression for _yi that is dependent on the choice
variables for person i at the time they are chosen is Fi. In other words, the
maximization problem for person i:
max
fijg2Nj=1
_yi
where _yi is given by (103)
reduces to:
max
fijg2Nj=1
Fi
where Fi is given by (104)
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Using (90) - (102) and (107), Fi simplies as follows (please refer to Section
8.4.2 of the Technical Appendix for calculations):
Fi = g
0(mS) 
X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij  _mdij (110)
= g0(mS)  (1 mS)  2g(mS) 8<:'i 
"
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
#
  (1 mS) 
X
j2A, j =2 iA
2ij
9=;
Thus, the optimization problem above further reduces to:
max
fij j j2A, j =2 iAg
Fi
where Fi is given by (110)
We examine this problem in two steps. In the rst step, we x in (97) any
'i, 0 < 'i  1, and consider the problem:
max
fij j j2A, j =2 iAg
Fi subject to
X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij = 'i (111)
where Fi is given by (110)
In the second step, we consider the choice of 'i. As shown in Section 8.4.2 of
the Technical Appendix, the rst step yields the following result:
Lemma A1. The optimization problem (111) has the solution:
ij =
'i
N  N for j 2 A, j =2  iA (112)
and Fi dened by (110) becomes
Fi = g
0(mS)(1 mS)2g(mS)
"
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
#
'i
(113)
where g0(mS)  (1 mS)  2g(mS) > 0 since mS < mB.
In the second step, we consider the choice of 'i that maximizes Fi given
by (113). Since g0(mS)  (1 mS)  2g(mS) > 0 because mS < mB, there are 3
di¤erent cases:
(i) when the term in square brackets in (113) is positive;
(ii) when the term in square brackets in (113) is negative;
(iii) when the term in square brackets in (113) is zero.
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Note that in any of these three cases, since we have been considering a
representative person i 2 A, if 'i is a solution to the maximization problem,
then the denition of the myopic core implies that
' = 'i for all i 2 A (114)
As shown in Section 8.4.3 of the Technical Appendix, we can readily see
that in cases (i) and (ii), condition (114) leads to a contradiction of either the
assumption concerning the sign of the term in the square brackets in (113)
given by the particular case, or to a contradiction of the denition of a steady
state. Hence, only case (iii) can occur at the myopic core, meaning that
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ') = 0
leading to:
Lemma A2. At the myopic core stationary state,
1  ' = 2 !
C
 (2 +
C
2
) mS   1
1 mS (115)
Hence
' = 1  2 !
C
 (2 +
C
2
) mS   1
1 mS (116)
=
2
 !
C  (1 mS)

" !
C
2
 (1 mS)  (2 + C
2
) mS + 1
#
where
0 < ' < 1 (117)
We can prove (117) as follows. Since maut =
1
2+C
2
< mS, (115) means that
1  ' > 0 and thus ' < 1. By the following reasoning, it must also be the
case that ' > 0 at the steady state. From (108),
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j 2  iB, when 'i = ' for all i 2 A :
_mdij = (1 mB)  2g(mS) 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
 (1 mB)  ij  mB   !  (1  '   ij)
	
Since mB > mS and (53) imply 1  (2 + C
2
) mB < 0, it follows that _mdij < 0
whenever '  0, which is inconsistent with the steady state condition (92).
Hence, whenever we have a solution for the steady state, it follows that ' > 0.
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Furthermore, we can readily conrm (please refer to Section 8.4.4 in the
Technical Appendix) that setting ij = 

ij given by (112) and using 1   '
given by (115), dynamics (107) yields
_mdij = 0 for all i 2 A, j 2 A, j =2  iA (118)
as expected from (90). In dynamics (106), setting 1  'i = 1  ' and using
(115), we can also conrm (please refer to Section 8.4.4) that
for i, j 2 A, j 2  iA: once mdij  mS, then
mdij < m
S forever after that time (119)
as expected from (91). Likewise, in dynamics (109), setting 1   'i = 1   '
given by (115), we can show that
for i 2 A, j 2 B, j =2  iB: once mdij  mB, then
mdij > m
B forever after that time (120)
as expected from (92).
Notice that since
 !
C is dened by (22), ' given by (116) involves another
unknown N. The other relationship for determining ' and N simultane-
ously can be obtained from another steady state condition, (92), as follows.
Setting 'i = '
 in (108) and arranging terms yields:
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j 2  iB,
_mdij = (1 mB)  2g(mS) 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
 mB   !  (1  ')  (1 mB  mB   ! )  ij
	
where ' is given in (116). A necessary condition for a steady state at mdij =
mdji = m
B is _mdij = 0 for j 2  iB, or
1 (2+C
2
)mB +(1 mB)C
2
1  e
1 + e ' = mB  ! (1 ')+(1 mB mB  ! )ij
An immediate implication is that ij is the same for all j 2  iB, and hence:
ij =
1  '
N
for all j 2  iB (121)
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Thus, using (22),
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
= mB   !  (1  ') + (1 mB  mB   ! )  1  '

N
= mB   !  (1  ')  (1  1
N
) + (1 mB)  1  '

N
= mB 
 !
C
2N
 (1  ') + (1 mB)  1  '

N
= (1 mB +mB 
 !
C
2
)  1  '

N
In short,
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e  ' (122)
= (1 mB +mB 
 !
C
2
)  1  '

N
implying that
N =
(1 mB +mB   !C
2
)  (1  ')
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1 e
1+e  ' (123)
Now we consider two cases. Either setting
 !
C = C in (22) for N  N ,
N =
(1 mB +mB  C
2
)  (1  ')
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1 e
1+e  '  N (124)
and
' = 1  2
C
 (2 +
C
2
) mS   1
1 mS
or setting
 !
C = C N=N in (22) for N < N , and then solving (123) for N:
N > N =
1 mB
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1 e
1+e  '   mBC2N  (1  ')
(125)
and
' = 1  2
C  N
N
 (2 +
C
2
) mS   1
1 mS (126)
In the rst case, substituting for ' in (124), the solution is represented
explicitly by (127) in Lemma A3 below. In the second case, we have two
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equations in the two unknowns ' and N. Substituting for ' in (124) and
solving the quadratic equation for N, we can obtain (128) below:
Lemma A3. At the myopic core stationary state, we have that
N = E(mB;mS) when E(mB;mS)  N (127)
where
E(mB;mS)  [m
B + 2
C
 (1 mB)]  (2+C2 )mS 1
1 mS
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1 e
1+e  (1  2C  (2+
C
2
)mS 1
1 mS )
or
N = D(mB;mS) when D(mB;mS) < N (128)
where
D(mB;mS)  H(mB;mS) +
p
H(mB;mS)2 + J(mB;mS)
H(mB;mS) 
h
mB + (1 mB)  C
C
N  1 e
1+e
i
 (2+C2 )mS 1
1 mS
2 
h
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1 e
1+e
i
J(mB;mS) 
2N
C
 (1 mB)  (2+C2 )mS 1
1 mS
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1 e
1+e
We can readily show that:
D(mB;mS) = N =) E(mB;mS) = N
Hence, (127) and (128) together dene N consistently.
Having determined all the endogenous variables (as functions of the exoge-
nous variables) at the New Eden, we now proceed to show that the New Eden
is in the myopic core. In general, the myopic core path will depend on initial
conditions, but here we focus on the steady state at the New Eden. Obviously,
we can x a time t and examine payo¤s for agents at that time since agents are
myopic. Fix an agent i. Much of the work in this subsection has been to show
that, starting at the New Eden state, if person i can choose fijg2Nj=1 where ji
is set to ij, they will choose the New Eden. This immediately implies that
no one or two person coalition can do better than the New Eden at a given
time t, as yi is independent of person is choice variables, and the selection of
fijg2Nj=1 to maximize _yi is optimal for each person i. More generally, we must
consider larger coalitions. Recall that this is a non-transferable utility game;
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side payments are not allowed. Notice that the calculations deriving the New
Eden all include the public knowledge transmission externality terms. Thus, if
person i could be dictator, they might for example wish to change kj for some
k 6= i, j 6= i in order to increase person is own payo¤ due to a change in the
public information transmission externality. However, due to the symmetry of
the solution (that is derived, not imposed), this would clearly lead to a loss of
utility for both persons k and j, who would then decline to join the coalition.
Since this is true for every person, and the New Eden is a feasible strategy, it
is not possible for any coalition to do better, and thus the New Eden is in the
myopic core. Summarizing the argument in this paragraph:
Lemma A4. The New Eden stationary state, described in the statement of
Proposition 2, is in the myopic core.
In order to show that the set of parameters generating a New Eden is
nonempty and open, consider the point a in Figure 7, corresponding to the
parameters given in (67) and (68). The point a is in the feasible domain.
Now, let us change the chosen parameters given by (67) just a little. Then,
the supreme iso-N curve from (57) and the maut-line from (50) shift only a
little. Thus, point a in Figure 7 remains inside the domain of a possible New
Eden. Therefore, when we change parameters  and  marginally from (68),
the point a moves only marginally, remaining inside the feasible domain for a
New Eden. From this observation and recalling Lemma 3, we can conclude
as follows:
Lemma A5. There is a nonempty, open set of exogenous parameters for
which there exists a welfare improving myopic core stationary state.
Putting together Lemmas A1-A5, we obtain Proposition 2.
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8 Appendix 3: Technical Appendix
8.1 Appendix a: Derivation of Equation (12)
Using (3) and (11),
aij=2
ni
=
nij
ni
 aij=2
nij
=
1
1 mdji
 (mcij)  (mdij mdji)
1 
2
=

 
1 mdij  mdji
  (mdij mdji) 1 2
1 mdji
= G(mdij;m
d
ji)
which leads to (12).
8.2 Appendix b: Derivation of Equation (74)
From (26) we have:
For i 2 A:
_ni
ni
=
X
j2A
ij  aij
ni
+
X
j2B
ij  aij
ni
+     (IAA
ni
 
X
j2A
ij  aij
ni
)
+e    IBB
ni
+ b    (IAB
ni
 
X
j2B
ij  aij
ni
) + !  (I i
ni
 
X
j2 iB
ij  aij
ni
)
= (1    )  (
X
j2A
ij  aij
ni
) + (1  b  ) X
j2B
ij  aij
ni
+     IAA
ni
+e    IBB
ni
+ b    IAB
ni
+ !  (I i
ni
 
X
j2 iB
ij  aij
ni
)
= (1    )  [ii  aii
ni
+
X
j2A i
ij  aij
ni
] + (1  b  ) X
j2B
ij  aij
ni
+    [
X
k2A
kk  akk
ni
+ (
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  akl
ni
)=2 
X
j2A
ij  aij
ni
]
+e    [X
k2B
kk  akk
ni
+ (
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  akl
ni
)=2]
+b    (X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  akl
ni
) + !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  akl
ni
 
X
j2 iB
ij  aij
ni
)
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= (1    )  [ii  aii
ni
+
X
j2A i
ij  aij
ni
] + (1  b  ) X
j2B
ij  aij
ni
+    [
X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
 akk
nk
+ (
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
 akl
nk
)=2]
+e    [X
k2B
kk  nk
ni
 akk
nk
+ (
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
 akl
nk
)=2]
+b    (X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
 akl
nk
)
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
 akl
nk
 
X
j2 iB
ij  aij
ni
)
= (1    )  [ii  +
X
j2A i
ij  2G
 
mdij;m
d
ji

] + (1  b  ) X
j2B
ij    2G
 
mdij;m
d
ji

+    [
X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
 + (
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk)]
+e    [X
k2B
kk  nk
ni
 + (
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk)]
+b    [X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk]
+ !  [
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk  X
j2 iB
ij    2G
 
mdij;m
d
ji

]
which leads to (74).
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8.3 Appendix c: Derivation of Equations (76) to (79)
In order to calculate _mdij by using equation (75), we rst obtain _n
d
ij for i 2 A
and j 2 A. Using (30) and (11), we have
For i 2 A, j 2 A:
for j 2  iA,
_ndij
nij
=
(1    )  P
k2A j
ik  aik
nij
+
(1  b  )  P
k2B
ik  aik
nij
= (1    )  [ii    ni
nij
+
X
k2A fi;jg
ik  aik
nij
] +
(1  b  )  P
k2B
ik  aik
nij
= (1    )  [ii    ni
nij
+
X
k2A fi;jg
ik  ni
nij
 aik
ni
] + (1  b  ) X
k2B
ik  ni
nij
 aik
ni
=
ni
nij

8<:(1    )  [ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  aik
ni
] + (1  b  ) X
k2B
ik  aik
ni
9=;
=
 
1 mdji
 
8<:(1    )  [ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
)
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For i 2 A, j 2 A:
for j =2  iA,
_ndij
nij
=
(1    )  P
k2A j
ik  aik
nij
+
(1  b  )  P
k2B
ik  aik
nij
+
 !  (I i  
P
k2 iB ik  aik)
nij
= (1    )  [ii    ni
nij
+
X
k2A fi;jg
ik  aik
nij
] +
(1  b  )  P
k2B
ik  aik
nij
+ ! 
 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  akl
nij
 
P
k2 iB ik  aik
nij
!
= (1    )  [ii    ni
nij
+
X
k2A fi;jg
ik  ni
nij
 aik
ni
] + (1  b  ) X
k2B
ik  ni
nij
 aik
ni
+ ! 
 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
 akl
nk
 
X
k2 iB
ik  ni
nij
 aik
ni
!
=
ni
nij

248<:(1    )  [ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  aik
ni
] + (1  b  ) X
k2B
ik  aik
ni
9=;
+ ! 
 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
!#
=
 
1 mdji
 
248<:(1    )  [ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
)
+ ! 
 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
!#
Similarly,
For i 2 A, j 2 A:
for j 2  iA,
_ndji
nij
=
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1    )  [jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
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For i =2  jA,
_ndji
nij
=
 
1 mdij
 
248<:(1    )  [jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
+ ! 
0@X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl  nk
nj
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
1A35
Next, we obtain _ncij for i 2 A and j 2 A. Using the second equation in
(28) yields
For i 2 A, j 2 A:
for j =2  iA,
_ncij
nij
=
ij  aij
nij
+     (IAA
nij
  ij  aij
nij
) + e    IBB
nij
+ b    IAB
nij
= ij  aij
nij
+    
24X
k2A
kk  akk
nij
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  akl
nij
1A =2  ij  aij
nij
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  akk
nij
+
0@X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  akl
nij
1A =2
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  akl
nij
= ij  ni
nij
 aij
ni
+    
24X
k2A
kk    nk
nij
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
nij
 akl
nk
1A =2  ij  ni
nij
 aij
ni
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
nij
+
0@X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
nij
 akl
nk
1A =2
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
nij
 akl
nk
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Thus, using equations (2), (3), (12), and (11), we have:
For i 2 A, j 2 A:
for j =2  iA,
_ncij
nij
= ij  (1 mdji)  2G(mdij;mdji) +    
"X
k2A
kk    ni
nij
 nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk  ij  ninij  2G(mdij;mdji)
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    ni
nij
 nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
= (1 mdji) 
(
(1    )  ij  2G(mdij;mdji)
+   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
)
Likewise, using the rst equation in (28) yields:
For i 2 A, j 2 A:
for j 2  iA,
_ncij
nij
=
ij  aij
nij
+     (IAA
nij
  ij  aij
nij
) + e    IBB
nij
+ b    IAB
nij
+
 !  I i
nij
Thus, following similar logic, we obtain:
35
for j 2  iA,
_ncij
nij
= (1 mdji) 
(
(1    )  ij  2G(mdij;mdji)
+   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
 ! 
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
)
36
Putting everything together, we have:
For i 2 A, j 2 A:
for j 2  iA, _mdij =
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
= (1 mdij)(1 mdji)
8<:(1    )  [ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
)
 mdij  (1 mdji)
(
(1    )  ij  2G(mdij;mdji)
+   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
+ ! 
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
)
 mdij 
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1    )  [jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
This yields equation (76).
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For i 2 A, j 2 A:
for j =2  iA, _mdij =
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
= (1 mdij)(1 mdji)
8<:(1    )  [ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
+ ! 
 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
!)
 mdij  (1 mdji)
(
(1    )  ij  2G(mdij;mdji)
+   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
)
 mdij 
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1    )  [jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  ) X
k2B
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
+ ! 
0@X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl  nk
nj
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
1A9=;
This gives us equation (77).
Next consider the case i 2 A, j 2 B. Using the rst equation in (31)
38
yields:
For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j 2  iB,
_ndij
nij
=
(1  e  )  P
k2A
ik  aik
nij
+
(1  b  )  P
k2B j
ik  aik
nij
+
(     e  )  (IAA  X
j2A
ij  aij)
nij
= (1  e  )  [ii    ni
nij
+
X
k2A i
ik  aik
nij
] +
(1  b  )  P
k2B j
ik  aik
nij
+(     e  )  "X
k2A
kk    nk
nij
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  akl
nij
1A =2  ii    ni
nij
 
P
k2A i ik  aik
nij
35
= (1  e  )  [ii    ni
nij
+
X
k2A i
ik  ni
nij
 aik
ni
] + (1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik  ni
nij
 aik
ni
+(     e  )  "X
k2A
kk    nk
nij
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
nij
akl
nk
1A =2  ii    ni
nij
 
X
k2A i
ik  ni
nij
aik
ni
35
=
ni
nij

8<:(1  e  )  [ii  + X
k2A i
ik  aik
ni
] + (1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik  aik
ni
+(     e  )  "X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
akl
nk
1A =2  ii    X
k2A i
ik  aik
ni
359=;
=
 
1 mdji
 
8<:(1  e  )  [ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
+(     e  )  "X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
359=;39
Similarly, using the rst equation in (32), we have:
For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j 2  iB,
_ndji
nij
=
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1  e  )  [jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2A i
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
+(     e  )  "X
k2B
kk  nk
nj
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
nj
G(mdkl;mdlk)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
359=;
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Next, using the second equation in (31) yields:
For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j =2  iB,
_ndij
nij
=
(1  e  )  P
k2A
ik  aik
nij
+
(1  b  )  P
k2B j
ik  aik
nij
+
(     e  )  (IAA  X
j2A
ij  aij)
nij
+
 !  (I i  
P
k2 iB ik  aik)
nij
= (1  e  )  [ii    ni
nij
+
X
k2A i
ik  aik
nij
] +
(1  b  )  P
k2B j
ik  aik
nij
+(     e  )  "X
k2A
kk    nk
nij
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  akl
nij
1A =2  ii    ni
nij
 
P
k2A i ik  aik
nij
35
+
 !  (Pk2 iAPl2 iB kl  akl  Pk2 iB ik  aik)
nij
= (1  e  )  [ii    ni
nij
+
X
k2A i
ik  ni
nij
 aik
ni
] + (1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik  ni
nij
 aik
ni
+(     e  )  "X
k2A
kk    nk
nij
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
nij
akl
nk
1A =2  ii    ni
nij
 
X
k2A i
ik  ni
nij
aik
ni
35
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
 akl
nk
 
X
k2 iB
ik  ni
nij
 aik
ni
)
=
ni
nij

8<:(1  e  )  [ii  + X
k2A i
ik  aik
ni
] + (1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik  aik
ni
+(     e  ) 
24X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
akl
nk
1A =2  ii    X
k2A i
ik  aik
ni
35
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
 akl
nk
 
X
k2 iB
ik  aik
ni
)
)
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=
 
1 mdji
 
8<:(1  e  )  [ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik    2G(mdik;mdki)
+(     e  )  "X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2G(mdik;mdki))
)
Similarly, using the second equation in (32), we have:
For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j =2  iB,
_ndji
nij
=
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1  e  )  [jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2A i
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj)
+(     e  )  "X
k2B
kk  nk
nj
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
nj
G(mdkl;mdlk)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl  nk
nj
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj))
9=;
Next, for i 2 A and j 2 B, we calculate _ncij. Using the second equation in
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(29) yields:
For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j =2  iB,
_ncij
nij
= ij  aij
nij
+ e   
24X
k2A
kk  akk
nij
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  akl
nij
1A =2
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  akk
nij
+
0@X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  akl
nij
1A =2
35
+b    "X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  akl
nij
  ij  aij
nij
#
= ij  ni
nij
 aij
ni
+ e   
24X
k2A
kk  ni
nij
   nk
ni
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
 akl
nk
1A =2
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  ni
nij
   nk
ni
+
0@X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
 akl
nk
1A =2
35
+b    "X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
 akl
nk
  ij  ni
nij
 aij
ni
#
Thus, using equations (2), (3), (12), and (11), we have:
For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j =2  iB,
_ncij
nij
= (1 mdji) 

(1  b  )  ij    2G(mdij;mdji)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
)
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Likewise, using the rst equation in (29), we have:
For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j 2  iB,
_ncij
nij
= ij  aij
nij
+ e   
24X
k2A
kk  akk
nij
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  akl
nij
1A =2
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  akk
nij
+
0@X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  akl
nij
1A =2
35
+b    "X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  akl
nij
  ij  aij
nij
#
+
 !  (I i   ij  aij)
nij
= ij  ni
nij
 aij
ni
+ e   
24X
k2A
kk  ni
nij
   nk
ni
+
0@X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
 akl
nk
1A =2
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  ni
nij
   nk
ni
+
0@X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
 akl
nk
1A =2
35
+b    "X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
 akl
nk
  ij  ni
nij
 aij
ni
#
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  ni
nij
 nk
ni
 akl
nk
  ij  ni
nij
 aij
ni
)
Thus, using equations (2), (3), (12), and (11), we have:
For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j 2  iB,
_ncij
nij
= (1 mdji) 

(1  b  )  ij    2G(mdij;mdji)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk  ij    2G  mdij;mdji)
)
44
Therefore, putting all of this together, we obtain:
For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j 2  iB, _mdij =
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
= (1 mdij)(1 mdji)
8<:(1  e  )  [ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik    2G(mdik;mdki) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
359=;
 mdij  (1 mdji)
(
(1  b  )  ij    2G(mdij;mdji)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk  ij    2G  mdij;mdji)
)
 mdij 
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1  e  )  [jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2A i
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2B
kk  nk
nj
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
nj
G(mdkl;mdlk)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
359=;
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and that gives us (78).
For i 2 A, j 2 B:
for j =2  iB, _mdij =
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
= (1 mdij)(1 mdji)
8<:(1  e  )  [ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2B j
ik    2G(mdik;mdki) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2A
kk  nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl  nk
nj
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2G(mdik;mdki))
)
 mdij  (1 mdji)
(
(1  b  )  ij    2G(mdij;mdji)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk    nk
ni
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
ni
G  mdkl;mdlk
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl  nk
ni
   2G  mdkl;mdlk
)
 mdij 
 
1 mdij
 
8<:(1  e  )  [jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)]
+(1  b  )  X
k2A i
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2B
kk  nk
nj
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  nk
nj
G(mdkl;mdlk)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl  nk
nj
   2G(mdkl;mdlk) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2G(mdjk;mdkj))
9=;
and that gives us (79).
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8.4 Technical Appendix for Proposition 2
8.4.1 Derivation of Dynamic Equations (105)-(109)
Focus on i 2 A. We will write down the dynamics of ni and mdij associated
with equation (103). Setting
ii = 0 (129)
ij = 0 for i; j 2 A, j 2  iA (130)
ij = 0 for i 2 A, j 2 B, j =2  iB (131)
mdij = m
S for i; j 2 A, j =2  iA (132)
mdij = m
d
ji = m
d < mSfor i; j 2 A, j 2  iA (133)
mdij = m
B for i 2 A; j 2 B; j 2  iB (134)
in (85):
For i 2 A:
_ni
ni
= [(
X
j2A
j =2 iA
ij)  2g
 
mS

] + (
X
j2 iB
ij)    2g
 
mB

+    [(
X
k2A i
X
l2A k
kl)  g
 
mS

]
+e    [(X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl)  g
 
mS

)]
+b    [(X
k2A i
X
l2B
kl)    2g
 
mB

]
+ !  [(
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl)    2g
 
mB
  (X
j2 iB
ij)    2g
 
mB

]
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Now setting
For i 2 A:X
j2A i
ij =
X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij = 'i (135)X
j2B
ij =
X
j2 iB
ij = 1  'i (136)X
l2A
kl =
X
l2A k
kl =
X
l2A, l =2 kA
kl = '
 for k 2 A i (137)X
l2B
kl =
X
l2B k
kl =
X
l2B, l =2 kB
kl = '
 for k 2 B (138)
X
l2B
kl =
X
l2B k
kl = 1  ' for k 2 A i (139)X
l2B
kl =
X
l2 iB
kl = 1  ' for k 2  iA, k 6= i (140)
and using (41) we have:
For i 2 A:
_ni
ni
= 'i  2g
 
mS

+ (1  'i)  2g
 
mS

+    (N   1)  '  g  mS
+e   N  '  g  mS
+b    (N   1)  (1  ')  2g  mS
+ !  [N  (1  ')  2g  mS  (1  ')  2g  mS]
= 2g
 
mS

+ [    (N   1)  ' + e   N  '
+2b    (N   1)  (1  ') + 2 !  (N   1)  (1  ')]  g  mS
Using (17), (18), (19), and (20):
For i 2 A:
_ni
ni
= 2g
 
mS

+ [C  1
1 + e  ' + C  e1 + e  '
+ bC  (1  ') + !C  (1  ')]  g  mS
= [2 + C  ' + ( bC + !C )  (1  ')]  g  mS
Then using (21):
For i 2 A:
_ni
ni
= g
 
mS
  [2 + C]
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which leads to (105).
Next, from (86),
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j 2  iA, (141)
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1 mdji)
8<:[ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2g(mdik)]
+
X
k2B
ik    2g(mdik)
)
 mdij 
(
ij  2g(mdij)
+   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

+ ! 
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g
 
mdkl
)
 mdij 
8<:[jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+
X
k2B
jk    2g(mdjk)
)
Using (129)-(134) and (135)-(140), we calculate each term in (141) separately:

[ii  +
X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2g(mdik)] = 0 +
X
k2 iA, k 6=i;j
ik  2g(mdik) +
X
k2A, k=2 iA
ik  2g(mdik)
= 0 + 0 + (
X
k2A, k=2 iA
ik)  2g(mS)
= 'i  2g(mS)
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 X
k2B
ik    2g(mdik) =
X
k2 iB
ik    2g(mdik) +
X
k2B, k=2 iB
ik    2g(mdik)
= (
X
k2 iB
ik)    2g(mB) + 0
= (1  'i)  2g(mS)

ij  2g(mdij) = 0
 X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl

= 0 +
X
k2A i
(
X
l2A k, l =2 kA
kl)  g
 
mS

+
X
l2A k
il  g
 
mdil

=
X
k2A i
'  g  mS+ 'i  g  mS
= [(N   1)  ' + 'i]  g
 
mS

 X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl

= 0 +N  '  g  mS
 X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

=
X
k2A i
(1  ')    2g  mB+X
l2B
il    2g
 
mdil

= (N   1)  (1  ')    2g  mB+ (1  'i)    2g  mB
= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]    2g
 
mB

= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g
 
mS

 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g
 
mdkl

= (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl)    2g
 
mB

= f
X
k2 iA, k 6=i
(1  ') + (1  'i)g  2g
 
mS

= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g
 
mS


[jj  +
X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2g(mdjk)] = 0 +
X
k2A j
jk  2g(mdjk)  ji  2g(mdji)
= 0 + '  2g  mS  0 = '  2g  mS
50
 X
k2B
jk    2g(mdjk) = (1  ')    2g
 
mB

= (1  ')  2g  mS
Substituting these terms into equation (141), we have:
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j 2  iA, (142)
_mdij
1 md = (1 m
d)

'i  2g(mS) + (1  'i)  2g(mS)
	
 md   0 +     [(N   1)  ' + 'i]  g  mS
+e    N  '  g  mS
+b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g  mS
+ !  [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g
 
mS
	
 md  '  2g  mS+ (1  ')  2g  mS	
= (1 md)  2g(mS)
 md  g  mS f     [(N   1)  ' + 'i]
+e   N  '
+2b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]
+2 !  [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]g
 md  2g  mS
= (1  2md)  2g(mS)
 md  g  mS f     (N   1)  ' +     'i
+e   N  '
+2b    (N   1)  (1  ') + 2b    (1  'i)
+2 !  (N   1)  (1  ') + 2 !  (1  'i)g
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Using (17)-(20) and using the approximations 'i = 0 and b(1 'i) = 0,
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j 2  iA,
_mdij
1 md = (1  2m
d)  2g(mS)
 md  g(mS) 

C
1 + e  ' + C  e1 + e  ' + 0
+ bC  (1  ') + 0
+
 !
C  (1  ') +
 !
C
N   1  (1  'i)
)
= (1  2md)  2g(mS)
 md  g(mS) 
n
C  ' + ( bC + !C )  (1  ')
+
 !
C
N   1  (1  'i)
)
= (1  2md)  2g(mS)
 md  g(mS) 
(
C  ' + C  (1  ') +
 !
C
N   1  (1  'i)
)
= (1  2md)  2g(mS) md  g(mS) 
(
C +
 !
C
N   1  (1  'i)
)
= 2g(mS) 
(
(1  2md) md 
"
C
2
+
 !
C
2(N   1)  (1  'i)
#)
Hence,
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j 2  iA, (143)
_mdij = (1 md)  2g(mS) 
(
1  (2 + C
2
) md  md 
"  !
C
2(N   1)  (1  'i)
#)
where mdij = m
d
ji = m
d
which gives us (106).
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Next, from (87),
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j =2  iA, (144)
_mdij
(1 mdij)
= (1 mdji) 
8<:[ii  + X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2g(mdik)]
+
X
k2B
ik    2g(mdik)
+ ! 
 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2g(mdik)
!)
 mdij 
(
ij  2g(mdij)
+   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl
)
 mdij 
8<:[jj  + X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+
X
k2B
jk    2g(mdjk)
+ ! 
0@X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2g(mdjk)
1A9=;
where

[ii  +
X
k2A fi;jg
ik  2g(mdik)] = 0 + (
X
k2A, k=2 iA
ik   ij)  2g(mS)
= ('i   ij)  2g(mS)
 X
k2B
ik    2g(mdik) = (
X
k2 iB
ik)    2g(mB)
= (1  'i)  2g(mS)
53
 X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2g(mdik)
= [
X
k2 iA, k 6=i
(1  ')    2g(mB) +
X
l2 iB
il    2g(mB)] 
X
k2 iB
ik    2g(mB)
=
X
k2 iA, k 6=i
(1  ')    2g(mB)
= (N   1)  (1  ')    2g(mB) = (N   1)  (1  ')  2g(mS)

ij  2g(mdij) = ij  2g(mS)
 X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl

= 0 +
X
k2A i
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl

+
X
l2A i
il  g
 
mdil

=
X
k2A i
X
l2A, l =2 kA
kl  g
 
mS

+
X
l2A, l =2 iA
il  g
 
mS

=
X
k2A i
'  g  mS+ 'i  g  mS
= [(N   1)  ' + 'i]  g
 
mS

 X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl

= 0 +
X
k2B
X
l2B, l =2 kB
kl  g
 
mS

=
X
k2B
'  g  mS = N  '  g  mS
 As shown earlier,X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g
 
mS


[jj  +
X
k2A fi;jg
jk  2g(mdjk)] = 0 +
X
k2A ;j
jk  2g(mdjk)  ji  2g(mdji)
= 0 + '  2g(mS)  ji  2g(mS)
= ('   ji)  2g(mS)
54
 As shown earlier,X
k2B
jk    2g(mdjk) = (1  ')  2g
 
mS

 X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2g(mdjk)
= [
X
k2 jA, k 6=j
(1  ')    2g(mB) +
X
l2 jB
jl    2g(mB)] 
X
k2 jB
jk    2g(mB)
=
X
k2 jA, k 6=j
(1  ')    2g(mB)
= (N   1)  (1  ')    2g(mB) = (N   1)  (1  ')  2g(mS)
Substituting these terms into equation (144), and setting mdij = m
d
ji = m
S
we have:
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j =2  iA,
_mdij
1 mS = (1 m
S)   ('i   ij)  2g(mS)
+(1  'i)  2g(mS)
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')  2g(mS)	
 mS   ij  2g(mS)
+    [[(N   1)  ' + 'i]  g(mS)]
+e    [N  '  g(mS)]
+b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS) 	
 mS   ('   ji)  2g(mS)
+(1  ')  2g(mS)
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')  2g(mS)	
55
= 2g(mS)   (1 mS) f ('i   ij)
+(1  'i)
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g
 mS  f ij
+
  
2
 [(N   1)  ' + 'i]
+
e  
2
 [N  ']
+b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)] g
 mS  f ('   ji)
+(1  ')
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g g
= 2g(mS)   (1 mS)  f (1  ij)
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g
 mS  f ij
+
  
2
 (N   1)  ' +   
2
 'i
+
e  
2
 [N  ']
+b    (N   1)  (1  ') + b    (1  'i)
+ 1  ji
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g g
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Using (17)-(20) and using the approximations 'i = 0 and b(1 'i) = 0,
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j =2  iA,
_mdij
1 mS = 2g(m
S) 

(1 mS)

(1  ij)
+
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
)
 mS 

ij + 1  ji
+
C
2
 1
1 + e  ' + 0
+
C
2
 e
1 + e  '
+
bC
2
 (1  ') + 0
+
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
) )
From equation (21), bC + !C = C, and by denition of myopic core, ij = ji.
Hence,
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j =2  iA,
_mdij
1 mS = 2g(m
S) 
"
(1 mS) 
(
(1  ij) +
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
)
 mS 

1 +
C
2
 ' + C
2
 (1  ')
 
= 2g(mS) 
(
1 mS   (1 mS)  ij + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
 mS   C
2
mS

= 2g(mS) 
(
1  2mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
 C
2
mS   (1 mS)  ij

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Hence,
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j =2  iA, (145)
_mdij = (1 mS)  2g(mS) 
(
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
 (1 mS)  ij
	
where mdij = m
d
ji = m
S
which gives us (107).
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Likewise, from (88),
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j 2  iB, (146)
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1 mdji)
8<:[ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)]
+
X
k2B j
ik    2g(mdik) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2A
kk  
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g(mdkl)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)
359=;
 mdij
(
ij    2g(mdij)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g
 
mdkl
  ij    2g  mdij)
)
 mdij 
8<:[jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+
X
k2A i
jk    2g(mdjk) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2B
kk  
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g(mdkl)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)
359=;
Using (129)-(134) and (135)-(140), we calculate each term in (146) separately:

ii  +
X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik) = 0 +
X
k2 iA, k 6=i
ik  2g(mdik) +
X
k2A, k=2 iA
ik  2g(mdik)
= 0 + 0 + (
X
k2A, k=2 iA
ik)  2g(mS)
= 'i  2g(mS)
59
 X
k2B j
ik    2g(mdik) =
X
k2B
ik    2g(mdik)  ij    2g(mdik)
= (1  'i)  2g(mS)  ij    2g(mB)
= (1  'i)  2g(mS)  ij  2g(mS)
= [(1  'i)  ij]  2g(mS)
 As shown earlier,X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g(mdkl)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)
= [(N   1)  ' + 'i]  g(mS)  0  'i  2g(mS)
= [(N   1)  '   'i]  g(mS)

ij    2g(mdij) = ij    2g(mB) = ij  2g(mS)
 As shown earlier,X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl

= [(N   1)  ' + 'i]  g(mS)
 As shown earlier,X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl

= N  '  g(mS)
 As shown earlier,X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS)
 As shown earlier,X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g
 
mdkl
  ij    2g  mdij
= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS)  ij    2g
 
mB

= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS)  ij  2g
 
mS


jj  +
X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk) = 0 + '  2g
 
mS

= '  2g  mS
60
 X
k2A i
jk    2g(mdjk) = (
X
k2 iA, k 6=i
jk)    2g(mB) = (1  '   ji)    2g(mB)
= (1  '   ji)  2g
 
mS

 X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g(mdkl)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)
= [(N   1)  ' + 'j]  g(mS)  0  'j  2g(mS)
= [(N   1)  ' + ']  g(mS)  '  2g(mS)
= (N   2)  '  g(mS)
Substituting each term into (146) and setting mdij = m
d
ji = m
B,
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j 2  iB,
_mdij
1 mB = (1 m
B)

['i  2g(mS)]
+[(1  'i)  ij]  2g(mS) + (     e  )  [(N   1)  '   'i]  g(mS) 	
 mB  ij  2g(mS)
+e    [(N   1)  ' + 'i]  g(mS)
+e   N  '  g(mS)
+b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS)
+ !  ([(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS)  ij  2g
 
mS

)
	
 mB  '  2g  mS
+(1  '   ji)  2g
 
mS

+ (     e  )  (N   2)  '  g(mS) 	
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Thus,
_mdij
1 mB = 2g(m
S) 

(1 mB)

'i
+[(1  'i)  ij] +
(     e  )
2
 [(N   1)  '   'i]

 mB f ij
+
e  
2
 [(N   1)  ' + 'i]
+
e  
2
N  '
+b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]
+ !  ([(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  ij)
' + (1  '   ji) + (     e  )
2
 (N   2)  '
 
_mdij
1 mB = 2g(m
S) 

(1 mB)

1  ij + (     e  )
2
 [(N   1)  '   'i]

 mB f ij   ji
+
e  
2
 [(N   1)  ' + 'i]
+
e  
2
N  '
+b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]
+ !  ([(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  ij)
+1 +
(     e  )
2
 (N   2)  '
 
By denition of myopic core, ij = ji. Using approximations
( e)
2
'i = 0,e
2
 'i = 0, and b    (1  'i) = 0, we have
_mdij
1 mB = 2g(m
S) 

(1 mB)

1  ij + (     e  )
2
 (N   1)  '

 mB
e  
2
 (N   1)  ' + e  
2
N  '
+b    (N   1)  (1  ')
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ') + !  (1  'i   ij)
+1 +
(     e  )
2
 (N   2)  '
 
Using (17)-(20), and using the approximations
(     e  )
2
=
1
2

C
N   1 
1
1 + e   CN  e1 + e

 C
2(N   1) 
1  e
1 + e
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and
N   1
N
 1, N   2
N   1  1
_mdij
1 mB = 2g(m
S) 

(1 mB)

1  ij + C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '

 mB

C
2
 e
1 + e  ' + C2  e1 + e  '
+
bC
2
 (1  ')
+
 !
C
2
 (1  ') + !  (1  'i   ij)
+1 +
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
 
Using (21),
_mdij
1 mB = 2g(m
S) 

(1 mB)

1  ij + C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '

 mB

C  e
1 + e  '
+
C
2
 (1  ')
+ !  (1  'i   ij)
+1 +
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
 
_mdij
1 mB = 2g(m
S) 

1 mB   (1 mB)  ij + C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '  mB  C2  1  e1 + e  '

 mB

C  e
1 + e  ' + C2  (1  ') + !  (1  'i   ij) + 1 + C2  1  e1 + e  '

Thus,
_mdij
1 mB = 2g(m
S) 

1  2mB   (1 mB)  ij + C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '

 mB

C
2
 1  e
1 + e  ' + C  e1 + e  ' + C2  (1  ') + C2  1  e1 + e  '

 mB   !  (1  'i   ij)
o
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= 2g(mS) 

1  2mB   (1 mB)  ij + C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '

 mB

C
2
 1  e
1 + e  ' + C2

 mB   !  (1  'i   ij)
o
= 2g(mS) 

1  2mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '   C2 mB
 (1 mB)  ij  mB   !  (1  'i   ij)
o
Therefore,
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j 2  iB, (147)
_mdij = (1 mB)  2g(mS) 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
 (1 mB)  ij  mB   !  (1  'i   ij)
	
where mdij = m
d
ji = m
B, and g(mS) =   g(mB)
which gives us (108).
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Finally, from (89),
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j =2  iB, (148)
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1 mdji)
8<:[ii  + X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)]
+
X
k2B j
ik    2g(mdik) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2A
kk  
+
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g(mdkl)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2g(mdik))
)
 mdij 
(
ij    2g(mdij)
+e   
24X
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+e   
24X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl
35
+b   X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl
)
 mdij 
8<:[jj  + X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)]
+
X
k2A i
jk    2g(mdjk) + (     e  ) 
"X
k2B
kk  
+
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g(mdkl)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)
35
+ !  (
X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2g(mdjk))
9=;
 As shown earlier,
ii  +
X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik) = 'i  2g(mS)
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 As shown earlier,X
k2B j
ik    2g(mdik) = (1  'i)  2g(mS)
 As shown earlierX
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g(mdkl)  ii   
X
k2A i
ik  2g(mdik)
= [(N   1)  '   'i]  g(mS)
 As shown earlier,X
k2 iA
X
l2 iB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 iB
ik    2g(mdik)
= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS)  (1  'i)    2g
 
mB

= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS)  (1  'i)  2g
 
mS

= (N   1)  (1  ')  2g(mS)

ij    2g(mdij) = 0
 As shown earlierX
k2A
kk  +
X
k2A
X
l2A k
kl  g
 
mdkl

= [(N   1)  ' + 'i]  g(mS)
 As shown earlier,X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g
 
mdkl

= N  '  g(mS)
 X
k2A
X
l2B
kl    2g
 
mdkl

= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS)

jj  +
X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk) = '  2g(mS)
 X
k2A i
jk    2g(mdjk) = (1  ')    2g(mB)
= (1  ')  2g(mS)
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 As shown before,X
k2B
kk  +
X
k2B
X
l2B k
kl  g(mdkl)  jj   
X
k2B j
jk  2g(mdjk)
= (N   2)  '  g(mS)
 X
k2 jA
X
l2 jB
kl    2g(mdkl) 
X
k2 jB
jk    2g(mdjk)
= [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS)
Substituting each term into (148) and setting mdij = m
d
ji = m
d,
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j =2  iB,
_mdij
1 md = (1 m
d)

'i  2g(mS)
+(1  'i)  2g(mS) + (     e  )  [(N   1)  '   'i]  g(mS)
+ !  ((N   1)  (1  ')  2g(mS))	
 md 
( e    [(N   1)  ' + 'i]  g(mS)
+e   N  '  g(mS)
+b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS)	
 md  ['  2g(mS)
+(1  ')  2g(mS) + (     e  )  (N   2)  '  g(mS)
+ !  ([(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]  2g(mS))
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= 2g(mS) 
n
(1 md) f'i
+(1  'i) +
     e  
2
 [(N   1)  '   'i]
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g
 md 
 e  
2
 [(N   1)  ' + 'i]
+
e  
2
N  '
+b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)] o
 md  f['
+(1  ') +      e  
2
 [(N   2)  ']
+ !  [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]g
o
= 2g(mS) 

(1 md) 

1 +
     e  
2
 [(N   1)  '   'i]
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g
 md 
 e  
2
 [(N   1)  ' + 'i]
+
e  
2
N  '
+b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]g
 md  f['
+(1  ') +      e  
2
 (N   2)  '
+ !  [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]g
o
= 2g(mS) 

(1 md) 

1 +
     e  
2
 [(N   1)  '   'i]
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g
 md 
 e  
2
 [(N   1)  ' + 'i]
+
e  
2
N  '
+b    [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]
+1 +
     e  
2
 (N   2)  '
+ !  [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]
	 o
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Using approximations ( e)
2
'i = 0, e2 'i = 0, and b    (1 'i) = 0, we
have
= 2g(mS) 

(1 md) 

1 +
     e  
2
 (N   1)  '
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g
 md 
 e  
2
 (N   1)  '
+
e  
2
N  '
+b    (N   1)  (1  ')
+1 +
     e  
2
 (N   2)  '
+ !  [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]
	 o
Using (17)-(20), and using the approximations
(     e  )
2
=
1
2

C
N   1 
1
1 + e   CN  e1 + e

 C
2(N   1) 
1  e
1 + e
and
N   1
N
 1, N   2
N   1  1
= 2g(mS) 

(1 md) 

1 +
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g
 md 
(
C
2
 e
1 + e  ' + C2  e1 + e  ' + bC2  (1  ')
+1 +
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
+ !  [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]
	 o
Using (21), we have
= 2g(mS) 

(1 md) 

1 +
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g
 md 
(
C  e
1 + e  ' + bC2  (1  ')
+1 +
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
+ !  [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]
	 o
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= 2g(mS) 

(1 md) 

1 +
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
+ !  (N   1)  (1  ')g
 md 
(
C
2
 ' +
bC
2
 (1  ') + 1
+ !  [(N   1)  (1  ') + (1  'i)]
	 o
= 2g(mS) 

(1 md) 

1 +
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
+
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
)
 md 
(
C
2
 ' +
bC
2
 (1  ') + 1
+
 !
C
2
 (1  ') + !  (1  'i)
) 9=;
= 2g(mS) 

(1 md) 

1 +
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
+
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
)
 md 

C
2
 ' + C
2
 (1  ') + 1 + !  (1  'i)
 )
= 2g(mS) 

(1 md) 

1 +
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  '
+
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
)
 md 

C
2
+ 1 + !  (1  'i)
 )
= 2g(mS) 
(
1 md + (1 md) 
"
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  ' +
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
#
 md  C
2
 md  md   !  (1  'i)

70
= 2g(mS) 
(
1  (2 + C
2
) md + (1 md) 
"
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  ' +
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
#
 md   !  (1  'i)
	
Therefore,
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j =2  iB, (149)
_mdij = (1 md)  2g(mS) (
1  (2 + C
2
) md + (1 md) 
"
C
2
 1  e
1 + e  ' +
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
#
 md   !  (1  'i)
	
where mdij = m
d
ji = m
d, and g(mS) =   g(mB)
which gives us (109).
8.4.2 Derivation of (110) and the proof of Lemma A1
Using (94)-(102), Fi dened by (104) becomes
Fi =
X
j2 iA, j 6=i
ij  g0(mdij)  _mdij +
X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij  g0(mdij)  _mdij
+
X
j2 iB
ij    g0(mdij)  _mdij +
X
j2B, j =2 iB
ij    g0(mdij)  _mdij
=
X
j2 iA, j 6=i
0  g0(mdij)  _mdij +
X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij  g0(mS)  _mdij
+
X
j2 iB
ij    g0(mB)  _mdij +
X
j2B, j =2 iB
ij    g0(md)  _mdij
= 0 +
X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij  g0(mS)  _mdij +
X
j2 iB
ij    g0(mB)  _mdij + 0
=
X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij  g0(mS)  _mdij
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Using (107),
Fi = g
0(mS) 
X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij  _mdij
= g0(mS)  (1 mS)  2g(mS) X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij 
(
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')  (1 mS)  ij
)
= g0(mS)  (1 mS)  2g(mS) 8<:'i 
"
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
#
  (1 mS) 
X
j2A, j =2 iA
2ij
9=;
which leads to (110).
Since g0(mS) > 0, the optimization problem (111) is equivalent to:
min
fij j j2A, j =2 iAg
X
j2A, j =2 iA
2ij subject to
X
j2A, j =2 iA
ij = 'i
that has solution:
ij =
'i
N  N for j 2 A, j =2  iA
which gives us (112). Thus,
X
j2A, j =2 iA
2ij = (N  N) 

'i
N  N
2
=
'2i
N  N
Since N  N
2
at a symmetric equilibrium,
'2i
N  N 
'2i
N=2
 1
N=2
Thus, for N large, we have
'2i
N  N  0
and thus
Fi = g
0(mS)(1 mS)2g(mS)
"
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
#
'i
which leads to (113).
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8.4.3 Showing that the term in the square brackets in equation
(113) must be zero
(i) If 1   (2 + C
2
)mS + (1  mS)   !C
2
 (1   ') > 0, then according to (113),
Fi is maximized at 'i = 1. In the myopic core, this holds for all i, so
' = 'i = 1 for all i 2 A
In that situation,
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ') (150)
= 1  (2 + C
2
)mS
Recall from (53) that
maut =
1
2 + C
2
< mS (151)
Hence from (150), 1  (2+ C
2
)mS+(1 mS)   !C
2
 (1 ') < 0, a contradiction.
So this case cannot occur.
(ii) If 1   (2 + C
2
)mS + (1   mS)   !C
2
 (1   ') < 0, then according to
(113), Fi is maximized when 'i = 0. Since in the myopic core this holds for
all i 2 A,
' = 'i = 0 for all i 2 A
Setting 'i = '
 = 0 in (108):
For i 2 A, j 2 B: for j 2  iB,
_mdij = (1 mB)  2g(mS) 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB
 (1 mB)  ij  mB   !  (1  '   ij)
	
= (1 mB)  2g(mS) 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB
 mB   !   (1 mB  mB   ! )  ij
	
= (1 mB)  2g(mS) 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB
 mB   !  (1  ij)  (1 mB)  ij
	
< 0
The last line follows because mB > mS and (151) imply 1  (2 + C
2
) mB < 0.
From (92), a necessary condition for a steady state at mdij = m
d
ji = m
B is
_mdij = 0 for j 2  iB, and hence we have a contradiction.
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(iii) Hence, at the myopic core, the following case must hold:
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ') = 0
8.4.4 Derivation of (118) to (120)
For i, j 2 A, j =2  iA, using 1 ' given by (115) and using the approximation
ij =
'i
N N  0, we have from (107):
_mdij = (1 mS)  2g(mS) 
(
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')  (1 mS)  ij
)
= (1 mS)  2g(mS) 
(
1  (2 + C
2
)mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')
)
= (1 mS)  2g(mS) 
(
1  2mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ')  C
2
mS
)
= (1 mS)  2g(mS) 
(
1  2mS + (1 mS) 
 !
C
2

 
2
 !
C
 (2 +
C
2
) mS   1
1 mS
!
 C
2
mS

= (1 mS)  2g(mS) 

1  2mS + (2 + C
2
) mS   1  C
2
mS

= (1 mS)  2g(mS)  f0g = 0
which leads to (118).
Next, for i, j 2 A, j 2  iA, in (106), setting 1  'i = 1  ' from (115):
For i 2 A, j 2 A: for j 2  iA,
_mdij = (1 md)  2g(mS) 
(
1  (2 + C
2
) md  md 
"  !
C
2(N   1)  (1  '
)
#)
= (1 md)  2g(mS) 
(
1  (2 + C
2
) md  md 
"  !
C
2(N   1) 
2
 !
C
 (2 +
C
2
) mS   1
1 mS
#)
= (1 md)  2g(mS) 
(
1  2md  md 
"
C
2
+
(2 + C
2
) mS   1
(N   1)  (1 mS)
#)
Since 1
2+C
2
 maut < mS by assumption, _mdij < 0 whenever mdij  maut. From
this, (119) follows.
Finally consider the case where the two potential collaborators are from
di¤erent regions, but not in the same inter-regional work group. We examine
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the di¤erence between di¤erential knowledge growth for people in the other
region who are not members of the same inter-regional working group, as
compared to people in the other region who are members of the same working
group. We evaluate this di¤erence at the bliss point md = mB. That is, from
(109) and (108):
For i 2 A, j,k 2 B: for j =2  iB, for k 2  iB
_mdij   _mdik
md=mB
= (1 mB)  2g(mS)(
(1 mB) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ') mB   !  (1  'i) + (1 mB)  ik +mB   !  (1  'i   ik)
)
where g(mS) =   g(mB)
Setting 'i = '
,
= (1 mB)  2g(mS)(
(1 mB) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ') mB   !  (1  ') + (1 mB)  ik +mB   !  (1  '   ik)
)
= (1 mB)  2g(mS)(
(1 mB) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ') + (1 mB)  ik  mB   !  ik
)
Using (20),
= (1 mB)  2g(mS)(
(1 mB) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ') + (1 mB)  ik  mB 
 !
C
2(N   1)  ik
)
and now (121):
= (1 mB)  2g(mS)(
(1 mB) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ') + (1 mB)  1  '

N
 mB 
 !
C
2(N   1) 
1  '
N
)
Provided that N  2, (N   1) N > 1 so 1
(N 1)N < 1. In this case,
> (1 mB)  2g(mS) 
(
(1  2mB) 
 !
C
2
 (1  ') + (1 mB)  1  '

N
)
> 0
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In summary,
For i 2 A, j,k 2 B: for j =2  iB, for k 2  iB
_mdij   _mdik
md=mB
> 0
Hence, once mdij = m
d  mB, then since mdik = mB for k 2  iB always, it
follows that mdij = m
d > mB forever after that time, implying (120).
8.4.5 Derivation of (56)
Substituting for ' from (116),
1  (2 + C
2
) mB
+(1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e  2 !C  (1 mS) 
" !
C
2
 (1 mS)  (2 + C
2
) mS + 1
#
= (1 mB +mB 
 !
C
2
) 
2 !
C
 (2+C2 )mS 1
1 mS
N
So
1 mS   (2 + C
2
) mB  (1 mS)
+(1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e  2 !C 
" !
C
2
 (1 mS)  (2 + C
2
) mS + 1
#
= (1 mB +mB 
 !
C
2
) 
2 !
C
 [(2 + C
2
) mS   1]
N
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e + (1 mB)  C !C  1  e1 + e
 mS 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e + (2 + C2 )  (1 mB)  C !C  1  e1 + e

=   2 !
C N
 (1 mB +mB 
 !
C
2
) +mS  (1 mB +mB 
 !
C
2
)  2  (2 +
C
2
)
 !
C N
1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e
+(1 mB)  C !
C
 1  e
1 + e + 2 !C N  (1 mB +mB 
 !
C
2
)
= mS 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  C
2
 1  e
1 + e
+(2 +
C
2
)  (1 mB)  C !
C
 1  e
1 + e + (1 mB +mB 
 !
C
2
)  2  (2 +
C
2
)
 !
C N
)
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N 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  1  e
1 + e 

C
2
+
C
 !
C

+
2
 !
C
 (1 mB +mB 
 !
C
2
)
= mS 

N 

1  (2 + C
2
) mB + (1 mB)  1  e
1 + e 

C
2
+ (2 +
C
2
)  C !
C

+(1 mB +mB 
 !
C
2
)  2  (2 +
C
2
)
 !
C
)
which leads to (56).
77
